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DEMOCRACY, CHOICE, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF
VOICE IN CONTEMPORARY MEDIA
Blake D. Morant*
INTRODUCTION
A robust press in a democratic society remains a philosophical tru-
ism.1 But what does "robust" truly mean when applied to contempo-
rary media? Judging from most commentary, the term primarily
refers to the industry's right to expressive freedom and the deference
afforded that right.2 This interpretation of autonomy reflects a nor-
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1. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("Thus we consider this case
against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on pub-
lic issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."); William
Penner, Note, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.: Upsetting the First Amendment Scales, 26 U.S.F. L.
REV. 753, 780 (1992) (opining that cases involving media restrictions require the consideration of
values in light of the public's interest in an open and robust press); Jay Framson, Notes and
Comments, The First Cut Is the Deepest, but the Second May Be Actionable: Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, Inc. and the Incremental Harm Doctrine, 25 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 1483, 1525
n.282 (1992) (noting that when assessing plaintiff's defamation claims, society's interest in a free
and robust press is stronger than an individual's interest in redressing a trivial injury to his or her
dignity); Mark A. Byrd, Comment, Quotations and Actual Malice: Bridging the Gap Between
Fact and Fiction, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 617, 620-21 (1990) (noting that courts have adopted more
relaxed defenses to defamation suits, such as a showing of a statement's substantial truth, in
recognizing of the value of a free and robust press, and in an effort to prevent media self-censor-
ship); Leslie Yalof Garfield, Note, Curtailment of Early Election Predictions: Can We Predict the
Outcome?, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 489, 496 (1984) (stating that a robust press also promotes free and
open discussion).
2. See C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 938
(2002) (arguing that press freedom provides the press with an "unimpeded, uncensored, oppor-
tunity to perform its constitutionally based role: being an independent source of information
and vision"); David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEx. L. REV. 429, 483 (2002) (opin-
ing that the tradition of expressive freedom is founded on independence from government, polit-
ical parties, and advertisers, as well as journalistic integrity); Garfield, supra note 1. at 496
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mative conceptualization of unrestricted behavior.3 Such an unduly
simplistic interpretation of autonomy, however, diminishes media's es-
sentiality as a guarantor of democracy. If media functions to secure
democratic processes, then its robust nature must include both the
sacrosanct right to expressive freedom and the duty to report the vari-
ety of viewpoints and perspectives that appeal to a diverse society.
This modest Article, which only commences the discussion of this
rich topic,4 advances a more expansive view of robustness as it relates
to the functionality of the media within an increasingly diverse soci-
ety. 5 I posit that genuine autonomy and media's legitimacy hinge not
only upon its freedom to disseminate, but also on the duty to exercise
that right in a manner that incorporates the diversity of individualized
perspectives. Viewpoint diversity summarily defines multiplicity of
voice6 and must become a prevalent factor in media's decisions to dis-
(noting that because free speech is considered a preeminent right under democratic theory,
courts have rarely allowed the abridgment of the First Amendment in furtherance of govern-
mental interests).
3. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Ex-
pression, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879, 1926 (2000) (arguing that the Free Press Principle demands the
promotion of a robust, autonomous mass media).
4. To explore fully the omnipresent tension between individual expressive rights and the soci-
etal need for expansive discourse would consume the space that the DePaul Law Review has
dedicated to this Symposium. I, therefore, consider my Article the first in what I hope will be a
series of scholarly pieces that examine the critical issue.
5. I employ the term "diverse" to connote both ethnicity and viewpoint. Of course, this Arti-
cle had its genesis through the invitation of this Symposium, which focuses on race as proxy.
Commensurately, diversity incorporates race and ethnicity. The ever-increasing number of di-
verse individuals in society certainly underscores the timeliness of this Symposium. However,
diversity, when discussed in the context of a responsible free press, is not confined to race and
ethnicity. It also applies to viewpoint. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY
QUICKFACrS (2000) available at http://www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/html (last visited
Mar. 29, 2004) (reporting that 24.9% of Americans responding to the 2000 decennial census
listed an ethnicity other than "White only"). Compare this with U.S. Census Bureau statistics
for the 1990 decennial census, reporting that only 19.7% of respondents listed an ethnicity other
than "White only." See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, UNITED STATES - RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN:
1790 TO 1990, available at http://www.census.gov/population/documentation/twps0056/tab0l.pdf
(last visited Apr. 18, 2004). See Bill Ong Hing, Vigilante Racism: The De-Americanization of
Immigrant America, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 441, 454 (2002) (noting that the growth of diversity in
the United States, now at an all-time high, is a concept that has defined this country since its
founding); cf Nancy S. Kim, The Cultural Defense and the Problem of Cultural Preemption: A
Framework for Analysis, 27 N.M. L. REV. 101, 138 (1997) (arguing that in the justice system,
traditional notions of subjective standards, such as intent, are no longer applicable in light of the
increasing diversity of the body of peoples to which they apply). Kim opines that as a result of
this changing societal structure, the legal rules designed to promote fairness must also adapt to
changing societal needs. Id. at 138.
6. For a more detailed explanation of multiplicity of voice, see infra notes 77-87 and accompa-
nying text.
CONTEMPORARY MEDIA
seminate news and information. 7 This Article advocates the continua-
tion of the government's media ownership rules, which generally
foster multiplicity's objective of robust discourse.
Part II of the Article commences with a discussion of media's func-
tion in a democracy. "Democracy" remains a relatively abstract con-
cept that is essential to any discussion of media's role in a diverse
society. Part II explains the various theories of democracy, commenc-
ing with the libertarian, autonomy-based norm that contributes to me-
dia's drive to inform, educate, and maximize wealth. It then contrasts
strict autonomy theory with civic republicanism, which deemphasizes
autonomy to ensure a more balanced debate. Part II then explains my
preference for a theory of democracy that emphasizes mutual respect
for the autonomous rights of others. This respect-model of autonomy
incorporates multiplicity as a factor in media's decision to report
information.
Part III of the Article describes the governmental influences on me-
dia's embrace of multiplicity. It briefly examines judicial decision
making that, over time, has limited governmental efforts that foster
multiplicity through programs that set aside procurements to minori-
ties or traditionally marginalized groups. The focus then shifts to
race-neutral tactics that ensure broader ownership and control of me-
dia sources. Central to this discussion are the Federal Communication
Commission (FCC) rules that limit ownership of media sources-a
tactic that, despite its nexus with multiplicity, may be weakened by the
agency's controversial decision to relax those rules. Part III then re-
buts the FCC's rationale for relaxation of those rules with a revisionist
view of scarcity. Instead of a blanket aggregate of total media
sources, the definition of scarcity, as it pertains to the utility of owner-
ship restrictions, should reflect only those sources from which the ma-
jority of individuals receive news and information.
Media's continued utility depends upon the industry's conscientious
and deliberate attempts to report information that responds to the
needs of increasingly diverse constituencies. Such thoughtful decision
making, which multiplicity of voice advances, ensures a robust debate
7. Certainly examination of the media within the context of this Symposium that focuses on
race as proxy is appropriate. Media has had a fundamental if not catalytic influence on society's
discussion of race, ethnicity, and gender. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (providing
details of coverage of the O.J. Simpson arrest and trial as an example of media impact on discus-
sion of racial issues). While multiplicity often encompasses racial and gender viewpoints, it is
not confined to those issues. It is a broad construct that includes a variety of perspectives on an
array of issues. For more regarding multiplicity and its parameters, see infra notes 77-87 and
accompanying text.
2004]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:943
of critical issues and enhances media's function as a monitor of de-
mocracy's functionality.
II. MEDIA'S FUNCTION WITHIN A DEMOCRACY
A critique of media should commence with an examination of the
industry's role within a democratic society. 8 Perhaps media's most
utilitarian function is its tendency to inform on matters of societal im-
port.9 The motivation to inform the public ideally leads to dissemina-
tion of information about the government and, theoretically,
preserves democracy. The informative function, which is virtually tan-
tamount to a duty, has prompted many to refer to the industry as the
"Fourth Estate." 10 Appreciation of this duty, however, requires some
8. See C. Edwin Baker, The Media That Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 318 (1998)
(positing that one can determine if a free press serves its function only when one determines the
type of free press each form of democracy requires and why it requires that type).
9. See C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 73 (2002) [hereinafter BAKER,
MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY] (noting media functions to "educate, inform political par-
ticipation, foment and energize civic and political participation, [and] provide a forum for public
debate and dialogue"); Philip L. Judy, Comment, The First Amendment Watchdog Has a Flea
Problem, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 541, 562 (1997) (noting that the Court's failure to demand the press
report fully and accurately contravenes the media's function of fostering an informed populace);
Michael D. Steger, Slicing the Gordian Knot: A Proposal To Reform Military Regulation of
Media Coverage of Combat Operations, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 957, 993 (1994) (noting the Court's
recognition of the media's function in informing the public); Russell W. Galloway, Basic Free
Speech Analysis, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 883, 913 (1991) (noting the Court's holding that the
media's function to inform is a compelling interest that satisfies strict scrutiny). For commentary
relevant to the ability of the press to educate the public through coverage of criminal proceed-
ings, see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1976). See also Susan E.
Harding, Note, Cameras and the Need for Unrestricted Electronic Media Access to Federal Court-
rooms, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 827, 846-47 (1996); Kelli L. Sager & Karen N. Frederiksen, Televising
the Judicial Branch: In Furtherance of the Public's First Amendment Rights, 69 S. CAL. L. REV.
1519, 1540-41 (1996); Dolores K. Sloviter, If Courts Are Open, Must Cameras Follow?, 26 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 873, 877 (1998); Nadine Strossen, Free Press and Fair Trial: Implications of the O.J.
Simpson Case, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 647, 654 (1995). For more regarding media's monitoring
function, see Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and
What the Law Should Do About It, 73 TUL. L. REV. 173, 231 (1998) (recognizing that media
"help[s] citizens monitor the performance of the official branches of government" and, thus,
becomes the "Fourth Estate of government" (footnote omitted); Vincent Blasi, The Checking
Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 562 (espousing the press as
a monitor of government, thereby allowing members of the body politic to pursue private goals
and objectives).
10. See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and Deference on
the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893, 965 (2003) (arguing that the "Fourth Estate" serves as
the best watchdog on a national level where it is more attuned to civil rights); Christopher S.
Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO.
L.J. 245, 333-34 (2003) (arguing that the media's independence from the government is critical to
the performance of a check on governmental abuse in their role as the "Fourth Estate");
Jonathan W. Lubell, The Constitutional Challenge to Democracy and the First Amendment Posed
by the Present Structure and Operation of the Media Industry Under the Telecommunications
Acts, 17 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 11, 44 (2003) (stating that reference to the media as the
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conceptualization of the democracy that media fosters."
A. Autonomy-Based Theories of Democracy and Their
Motivational Influences
A true democracy conjures images of a society in which each mem-
ber enjoys an equal right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness."'1 2 Aristotelian principles, which have probative relevance to
modern conceptualizations of democracy, emphasize equality and jus-
tice in terms of the just application of legal principles and the "moral"
training of citizens who adopt a habit-forming behavior of law abi-
dance.13 Liberty becomes synonymous with autonomy and, thus, in-
"Fourth Estate" reflects the "role of the First Amendment and its critical contribution to the
people's self-governance").
11. See BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 129-53. The author
comments on several forms of democracy and media requirements of each. An elitist democracy
does not require a press that provides for, or promotes, society's political involvement, but only
one that performs the watchdog, or "checking function." Id. at 133. A liberal-pluralist form of
democracy requires a press that facilitates the democratic bargaining process between the gover-
nors and the governed by providing individuals and organized groups with information pertinent
to their respective interests and helping to motivate people to promote those interests. Id. at
138, 148. A republican form of democracy requires a press that facilitates "the process of delib-
erating about and choosing values and conceptions of the common good"; one that is thought-
fully discursive, yet inclusive. Id. at 143, 148. Finally, a complex form of democracy requires
media that assist groups in recognizing when their interests are at stake, search for "general
societal agreement on 'common goods,"' and "pursue their own separate vision." Id. at 149. For
more on various forms of democracy and their respective media requirements, see generally
Baker, supra note 8.
12. See Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 716 (2001) (noting
that Aristotle's concept of democracy was one in which all citizens are "to rule and be ruled in
turn") (citation omitted). The author posits that representative governments developed by the
Western cultures owe nothing to this early form of democracy, but instead, can be seen as a form
of mixed government. Id. at 718-21. See Rajendra Ramlogan, The Human Rights Revolution in
Japan: A Story of New Wine in Old Wine Skins?, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 127, 150-51 (1994)
(noting that the Western concept of democracy, based on an electoral system in which the people
can elect and periodically remove the leaders, creates an environment conducive to the notion of
the rights of the individual and a balance of power between the government and the governed);
see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (opining that
under a democracy, even fundamental rights (such as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness)
may be restricted to protect a state from destruction, or serious political, economical, or moral
injury).
13. See Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Democracy, Equality, and Taxes, 54 ALA. L. REV. 415, 443-
44, 452 (2003) (noting that Aristotle's definition of democracy shows that freedom and equality
are inherent principles upon which a government where the poor are more powerful than the
rich may be founded); Eugene Garver, Why Should Anybody Listen? The Rhetoric of Religious
Argument in Democracy, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 353, 378-79 (2001) (noting the necessity, in
an Aristotelian democracy, for the citizens to know each other's characters in order to distribute
offices based on merit); Rubin, supra note 12, at 716 (defining an Aristotelian democracy as one
in which all citizens are "to rule and be ruled in turn"); Expert Report of Patricia Gurin, Gratz v.
Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-75321), Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.
Supp. 2d 874 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-75928), 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 363, 374 (1999) (noting
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cludes expressive freedom, 14 which is a cornerstone of democracy.
Freedom of speech and press theoretically leads to an informed and
educated citizenry that seeks to maximize individual goals and
desires. 15 This libertarian notion constitutes a fundamental, norma-
tive construct of a democracy. 16 The societal significance of expres-
sive autonomy as a core right of individuals bodes for minimal
governmental restriction-a linchpin concept in the negative theory of
free speech.' 7
that what makes an Aristotelian democracy work is equality among citizens who "hold diverse
perspectives, and whose relationships are governed by freedom and rules of civil discourse");
Martin D. Carcieri, Operational Need, Political Reality, and Liberal Democracy: Two Suggested
Amendments to Proposition 209-Based Reforms, 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 459, 493 n.133
(1999) (noting Aristotle's statement that "while the goal of democracy is liberty, its conception
of justice is equality"); Maxine Eichner, Square Peg in a Round Hole: Parenting Policies and
Liberal Theory, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 133, 173 (1998) (noting Aristotle's recognition of the impor-
tance of personal character and, consequently, the upbringing of citizens).
14. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees, inter alia, freedom of expres-
sion and reads:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble; and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Press," as the Constitution states, constitutes a relatively generic term
that encompasses a variety of media forms, including print and broadcast. Of course, media are
not fungible, with each medium of communication constituting a "law into itself." See Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949). Secondly, the First Amendment paradigm applies differently to
various forms of media. See generally FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
15. See WOLFGANG VON LEYDEN, ARISTOTLE ON EQUALITY AND JUSTICE: His POLITICAL
ARGUMENT 81, 82 (1985) (noting Aristotle's view that democracy includes the "moral training
and habit-formation for the development of a citizen's sense of law-abidance and for a just appli-
cation of the principle of equality" and "character formation," which leads to an "equalisation of
desires").
16. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 200 (1996) (recognizing the value of autonomy as a fundamental value of the
First Amendment, with freedom of expression as a furtherance of the individual will). Other
scholars provide insight into the bounds of libertarianism as it applies to free expression. Sum-
marily stated, libertarianism assumes an absolutist view, which, as Professor Harry Kalven, Jr.
writes, requires that speech must be protected "for everyone, [or] we will have it for none." See
Victor C. Romero, Restricting Hate Speech Against "Private Figures": Lessons in Power-Based
Censorship from Defamation Law, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 15 (2001); but see LEE C.
BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN
AMERICA 57 (1986) (opining that libertarian's weakness is the protection it affords those who
seek to destroy the "values of free speech of others"); see also Richard Epstein, Property, Speech
and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 71-75 (1992). For distinctions between liberta-
rian and democratic theories of speech, see OWEN M. FIss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 3
(1996).
17. Justice Stephen Breyer, during an address at the New York University Law School, re-
cently commented on the bounds of this libertarian notion of free speech. Justice Breyer posits
that the Constitution seeks a democratic government as well as the individual's negative freedom
from governmental restraint. He believes that when facing questions of constitutional concern,
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Libertarian or autonomy-based theories, which seemingly dominate
the jurisprudential landscape, have influenced the motivational behav-
ior of contemporary media sources. One ancillary effect of expressive
autonomy includes the industry's tendency to influence public thought
and behavior. 18 While it is debatable whether news reports and edito-
rial commentary can actually change attitudes, there is historical proof
that media acts subtly to influence public behavior.
In his political pamphlet, Common Sense, Thomas Paine urged the
fledgling colonies of America to revolt against England. 19 Paine failed
to convert the Tories, but crystallized the resentment of many colo-
nists who adopted a revolutionary ideology. There were, of course,
more modern examples of media's subtle impact on events. William
Randolph Hearst's New York Journal argued for war against Spain in
the Court should heed this underlying purpose of the Constitution and promote an active and
constant participation in collective power. See generally Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Con-
stitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245 (2002).
18. See Leonard M. Baynes, Racial Stereotypes, Broadcast Corporations, and the Business
Judgment Rule, 37 U. RICH. L. REv. 819, 893-94 (2003) (noting the effects of media's projection
of stereotypes on children, namely their shaping of those children's perceptions of people of
color, which are carried through to adulthood); Paul A. LeBel, Misdirecting Myths: The Legal
and Cultural Significance of Distorted History in Popular Media, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1035,
1036-37 (2002) (noting the potentially detrimental effects of broadcast and published works of
fiction on the viewer, namely cases in which the viewer has been incited to carry out violent
acts); Michael L. Landsman, The European Community's Television Quota Reappraised, 8 ME-
DIA L. & POL'y 29, 32 (1999) (citing the Third Reich's use of the mass media as an example of
the potential for using the power of media to influence thought and behavior). The author
quotes Hitler as saying that "he could never have conquered Germany without the loud-
speaker." Id.
19. See generally THOMAS PAINE, Common Sense, in 2 THE LIFE AND WORKS OF THOMAS
PAINE 97 (William M. Van der Weyde ed., 1925). See also David Ray Papke, Law, Cinema, and
Ideology: Hollywood Legal Films of the 1950's, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1473, 1482 (2001) (citing
Thomas Paine as saying, in Common Sense, that in America the law could be king); Paul Schiff
Berman, An Observation and a Strange but True "Tale": What Might the Historical Trials of
Animals Tell Us About the Transformative Potential of Law in American Culture?, 52 HASTINGS
L.J. 123, 133 (2000) (citing Thomas Paine, in Common Sense, as suggesting that in order to fill
the gap left by overthrowing the monarch, the American people could draft a legal charter, place
it on top of the Bible, and then place a crown on the charter); Gregory C. Keating, Fidelity to
Pre-existing Law and the Legitimacy of Legal Decision, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4 n.3 (1993)
(quoting THOMAS PAINE, Common Sense, in COMMON SENSE AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS
3, 32 (Nelson F. Adkins ed., 1953)) ("But where, says some, is the King of America? I'll tell you,
friend, he reigns above, and does not make havoc of mankind like the royal brute of Britain ....
[I]n America the law is king. For as in absolute governments, the King is law, so in free coun-
tries the law ought to be King; and there ought to be no other."); Helen K. Michael, The Role of
Natural Law in Early American Constitutionalism: Did the Founders Contemplate Judicial En-
forcement of "Unwritten" Individual Rights?, 69 N.C. L. REV. 421, 446-47 (1991) (citing the dem-
ocratic theory of natural law as that which inspired Thomas Paine's call to arms in Common
Sense); Stephanie A. Levin, The Deference That Is Due: Rethinking the Jurisprudence of Judicial
Deference to the Military, 35 VILL. L. REV. 1009, 1030 n.96 (1990) (citing Thomas Paine as saying,
in Common Sense: "Every spot of the old world is overrun with oppression" and "[w]e have it in
our power to begin the world over again").
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1898. While no one would say that Hearst's publication sparked the
movement toward war, it undoubtedly contributed to a climate of war
fever.20
More recent and dramatic examples of media's influence were re-
ports of Trent Lott's statements during the centennial birthday cele-
bration of retired Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina. 21
Many opined that these reports sparked intense public discourse that
contributed substantially to Lott's resignation as Republican Majority
Leader in the House. 22
20. See BEN PROCTOR, WILLIAM RANDOLPH HEARST: THE EARLY YEARS, 1863-1910, at 115-
34 (1998) (describing how Mr. Hearst deployed his formidable media assets to advance causes
that he deemed just, including the Spanish-American War of 1898); Lubell, supra note 10, at 28-
31 (citing William Randolph Hearst and his New York Journal as illustrating the most skillful
utilization of "yellow journalism's" power, that is the power to both maximize profits and fulfill a
political agenda). The author notes Hearst's desire for a war with Spain, and the subsequent
publication by his New York Journal of a stolen private letter from Spanish Minister Dupuy de
Lome, in which de Lome ridiculed President William McKinley as "weak and catering to the
rabble, and besides, a low politician." Id. at 31. See also Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing
International Law: The Comparative and Historical Context, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 458 (2002)
(citing William Randolph Hearst as propelling the United States into war with Spain); Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr. & A. Richard M. Blaiklock, Enhancing the Spectrum: Media Power, Democ-
racy, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 813, 875 n.408 (noting historians' gen-
eral acknowledgment that "screaming headlines and inaccurate, one-sided stories in Hearst's
newspapers fanned public sentiment against Spain and greatly contributed to bringing about the
Spanish-American War"); Detlev F. Vagts, The Traditional Legal Concept of Neutrality in a
Changing Environment, 14 AM. U. Ir'L L. REV. 83, 97 (1998) (noting Hearst's use of newspaper
accounts of Spanish atrocities in Cuba to incite dislike for Spain).
21. See Thomas B. Edsall, Lott Decried for Part of Salute to Thurmond; GOP Senate Leader
Hails Colleague's Run as Segregationist, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2002, at A6 (noting the criticism
surrounding Senator Lott's statement that the United States would have been better off if then-
segregationist candidate Strom Thurmond had won the presidency in 1948); Kenneth R. Bazinet,
Jesse Wants Lott Cast Out for Dixiecrat Dig, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Dec. 9, 2002, at 8 (noting Rever-
end Jesse Jackson's calling for Senator Lott to resign as GOP leader after his remarks regarding
Strom Thurmond).
22. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Elisabeth Bumiller, In a Rare Political Moment, Powell Criti-
cizes Sen. Lott; Meanwhile, Sen. Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island Becomes the First Republican
Senator to Publicly Call for Trent Lott's Resignation, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Dec. 19, 2002, at A3
(noting Senator Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island as the first Republican senator to publicly call
for Lott's outright resignation); Mary Leonard, Conservatives Say Lott Hurts Agenda They're
Contending He Should Resign for Their Programs To Advance, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 20, 2002,
at A3 (noting conservatives' fear that the firestorm engulfing Senate GOP leader Trent Lott has
"jeopardized prospects for welfare reform, school vouchers, expanding federal grants to religious
charities, and confirming conservative judges"); Stephen Dinan, Lott Resigns Senate Leadership
Post; Will Retain His Seat; Frist Set To Succeed Him, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2002, at Al (noting
Senator Lott resignation as Senate Republican leader as a result to pressure over the racially-
charged comments he made regarding Strom Thurmond); Vincent Morris, Spent Trent Quits
GOP Helm: Will Remain in Senate as Frist Waits in Wings, N.Y. POST, Dec. 21, 2002, at 5 (noting
the pressure Senator Lott received from Republican allies, forcing him to resign his leadership
post).
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Full and fair reporting has legitimacy beyond its tendency to expose
wrongs or influence behavior. It also correlates to media's ethical re-
sponsibility to provide complete information for a diverse populace.23
Fulfillment of this equitable duty would presuppose the inclusion of
multiple viewpoints on issues of societal importance.
Profit, however, arguably constitutes the most dominant manifesta-
tion of autonomy, and media's most potent motivator. 24 Virtually
every media concern, whether it is broadcast or print, has a consuming
goal to maximize pecuniary gain.25 The need for profit fuels the quest
23. See generally Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding that the press
has a responsibility to report fully and accurately the proceedings of government and public
records and cannot be held liable for publishing truthful information.); see Edward J. Pauw &
Ari Chaim Shapiro, Comment, Defamation, The Free Press, and Latin America: A Roadmap for
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Emerging Democracies, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 203, 205 (1998) (arguing that the media has the generally recognized right to publish
truthful information, as well as the generally recognized duty to report accurately and refrain
from defamation); Judy, supra note 9, at 545 (noting the Court's tradition of stating that the
media should report fully and accurately, but not demanding it). Various news organizations and
many voluntary associations for journalists have endorsed ethical codes designed, inter alia, to
seek the truth and ensure accuracy and fairness in reports of news events. For example, see
GANNETr NEWSPAPER Div., PRINCIPLES OF ETHICAL CONDUCT FOR NEWSROOMS, available at
http://www.gannett.com/job/jobs/principles.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2004); ASSOCIATED PRESS
MANAGING EDITORS, APME CODE OF ETHICS REVISED AND ADOPTED 1995, available at http://
www.apme.com/about/codeethics.shtml (last visited Apr. 1, 2004); RADIO-TELEVISION NEWS
DIRECTORS ASS'N & FOUND., CODE OF ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, available at,
www.rtnda.org/ethics/coe.shtml (last visited Apr. 1, 2004); AM. SOC'Y OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS,
ASNE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, available at http://www.asne.org/index.cfm?id=888 (last vis-
ited, Apr. 1, 2004); E.W. SCRIPPS CO., STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, available at http://www.asne.org/index.cfm?ID=395 (last visited, Apr. 1, 2004); and
the SOC'v OF PROF'L JOURNALISTS, CODE OF ETHICS, available at http://www.spj.org/eth-
icsscode.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2004), which, roughly summarized, implore journalists to: seek
the truth and report it; minimize harm to victims and similarly situated third parties; act indepen-
dently to avoid conflicts of interest; and remain accountable to readers or viewers. For more on
the journalists' code of ethics, see generally JAY BLACK, ET AL., DOING ETHICS IN JOURNALISM
(3d ed. 1999); see also Lou Hodges, Rationale for the Proposed Code, and Other Concerns, CHI-
CAGO HEADLINE CLUB, at http://www.headlineclub.org/forum/ethics/rationale.html (Mar. 14,
2002) (last visited Jan. 16, 2003).
24. See Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 TEX.
L. REV. 1627, 1644 (1999) (noting that media owners will occasionally, in the pursuit of profit-
maximization, endorse political candidates in exchange for political favors). Advertisers, be-
cause of the financial support they provide for media, often exert great influence over program-
ming content. See generally C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS 45-69
(1994) (analyzing the influence of advertisers over programming content).
25. See Elizabeth Thoman, Screen-Agers . . . and the Decline of the "Wasteland", 55 FED.
COMM. L.J. 601, 606 (2003) (noting that most media messages are constructed to gain profit or
power); Rick S. Lear & Jefferson D. Reynolds, Your Social Security Number or Your Life: Dis-
closure of Personal Identification Information by Military Personnel and the Compromise of Pri-
vacy and National Security, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 23 (2003) (describing the media as a largely
profit-motivated industry that is not self-regulated); James E. Michel, Student Article, Embark-
ing On Its Most Extensive Review of Media Ownership: The FCC's Endeavor to Create a Happy
Medium, 15 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 249, 272 (2003) (noting that as major networks grow, their
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for larger audiences. 26 Profit maximization seems to overshadow me-
dia's ethical duty to disseminate fully information about important so-
cietal matters.2 7 Indeed, the drive for audience often encourages
feeding frenzy, which can significantly distort news reports.28
need to maximize profits to compete with other media giants often surpasses their obligation to
offer fair and complete programming); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to
Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 46-47 (2002)
(noting that the prevalence of news content regarding corporate fraud is furthered by the me-
dia's profit incentive to attract more viewers and those viewers' viewing preferences); C. Edwin
Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up On Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV. 839, 871 (2002) (argu-
ing that when government policymakers recommend less intervention and regulation, they give
in to the film industry's search for higher profit levels and create a viewing environment less
likely to sympathize with diverse social issues); Susan Harris, Open Hearings: A Questionable
Solution, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 673, 678 (2000) (describing the perspective of those advo-
cates for closed hearings in juvenile protection cases as driven by the fear of the media's profit
motive and trend of only covering cases that serve a prurient public interest, which bear the risk
of causing emotional harm to the child); Hasen, supra note 24, at 1631 (describing media owners
as profit- or influence-maximizers who use their news outlets to endorse their own interests and
secure access to public officials); Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of
Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843, 874 (2002) (noting that sensational stories, and the accom-
panying profit levels, provide incentive for news groups to disclose potentially embarrassing pri-
vate facts about public officials).
26. See Kelly L. Cripe, Comment, Empowering the Audience: Television's Role in the Dimin-
ishing Respect for the American Judicial System, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 235, 250 (1999) (noting
that as ratings climb, so do profits, and the incentive to cover high-profile trials from "gavel to
gavel"); Lidsky, supra note 9, at 218 (arguing that news shows can afford to use questionable
newsgathering techniques because of the higher profits associated with the higher ratings they
seek); David A. Logan, Masked Media: Judges, Juries, and the Law of Surreptitious Newsgather-
ing, 83 IOWA L. REV. 161, 161-62 (1997) (arguing that undercover reporting by "newsmagazine"
shows, which raise serious issues of journalistic ethics, have proliferated due to increasing ratings
and thus profits); Karen L. Gulick, Creative Control, Attribution and the Need for Disclosure: A
Study of Incentives in the Motion Picture Industry, 27 CONN. L. REV. 53, 81 (1994) (noting the
coloring of classic black-and-white films leads to a larger market-share rating and thus profits).
27. See infra notes 77-87 (discussing the concept of multiplicity of voice).
28. See Margery Malkin Koosed, The Proposed Innocence Protection Act Won't-Unless It
Also Curbs Mistaken Eyewitness Identifications, 63 OHIo ST. L.J. 263, 286-87 (2002) (asking
whether media frenzy has prompted more persons to gather fame through becoming a witness,
possibly leading to a skewed version of their testimony due to constant media exposure); Marc
Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ.
L. REV. 717, 717 (1998) (arguing that distorted, sensationalized stories resulting from media
frenzy lead to a perception of the civil justice system which perpetuates frivolous lawsuits); Mar-
garet M. Russell, Beyond "Sellouts" and "Race Cards": Black Attorneys and the Straitjacket of
Legal Practice, 95 MICH. L. REV. 766, 793 (1997) (positing that the behavior of attorneys in the
O.J. Simpson case was influenced by the media frenzy, namely the ever-present cameras in the
courtroom); Jonathan M. Remshak, Comment, Truth, Justice, and the Media: An Analysis of the
Public Criminal Trial, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1083, 1116 (1996) (noting that federal court
proceedings have not been subject to the same type of media frenzy that state court proceedings
have been, mostly due to the inadmissibility of cameras into the courtroom, thus affording
greater protection to the defendant's right to a fair trial); Barbara Moretti, Outing: Justifiable or
Unwarranted Invasion of Privacy? The Private Facts Tort as a Remedy for Disclosures of Sexual
Orientation, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 857, 878 (1993) (opining that the media frenzy
spawned by a political candidate's alleged sexual indiscretions leads to an inadequate coverage
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Perhaps the most notorious example of media frenzy was coverage
of the O.J. Simpson arrest and trial for the murder of Nicole Brown
Simpson, his estranged wife.2 9 Time magazine published on its cover
an obscure and darkened picture of a recently arrested Simpson.30
Some believed that the Time publication of a more sinister-looking
Simpson inflamed racial animus.31 Moreover, distorted and seemingly
unending coverage of sensational events, such as the Simpson trial,
undoubtedly resulted from media's zeal to capture a huge audience. 32
Other manifestations of the quest for ratings are sensational pro-
grams such as reality and tabloid-like shows. Professor Cass R. Sun-
stein believes that media's ravenous quest for gain, fueled by rampant
autonomy, has contributed to the increase in sensational program-
ming.33 The proliferation of this type of programming lends credence
of the more significant issues facing the electorate). The author argues: "Under these circum-
stances, the press fails miserably in its appointed function." Id.
29. See People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 1995); Blake D. Morant,
Resolving the Dilemma of the Televised Fair Trial: Social Facilitation and the Intuitive Effects of
Television, 8 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 329 (2001); see also GILBERT GElS & LEIGH B. BIENEN,
CRIMES OF THE CENTURY: FROM LEOPOLD AND LOEB TO O.J. SIMPSON 104 (1998) (noting that
direct telegraph lines and special teletype machines connected reporters covering the trial to
Berlin, Paris, Melbourne, and Buenos Aires); Ralph E. Roberts, Jr., An Empirical and Norma-
tive Analysis of the Impact of Televised Courtroom Proceedings, 51 SMU L. REV. 621, 622 (1998)
(mentioning the extensive television coverage of the Simpson trial); Peter M. Agulnick, In
Search of Truth: A Case for Expanding Perjury's Recantation Defense, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 353,
354 (1997) (citing the Simpson trial as the most televised trial in history); Christo Lassiter, The
Appearance of Justice: TV or Not TV-That Is the Question, 86 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 928,
930 (1996) (commenting on the magnitude of media coverage of, and public interest in, the
criminal proceedings involving O.J. Simpson).
30. See Time's June 27, 1994 cover.
31. See Time Magazine Darkens and Blurs O.J. Simpson Mug Shot, June 21, 1994, 1994 WL
10150984 (noting that Time and Newsweek both used Simpson's mug shot, but that Time had an
artist darken and blur the face, but not, according to a Time spokesperson, in an effort to mis-
lead); see also Peter Arenella, People v. Simpson: Perspective on the Implications for the Crimi-
nal Justice System-Foreword: O.J. Lessons, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1258 (1996) (arguing that
the darkened Time magazine picture epitomizes how badly our culture deals with race); Edgar
Allen Beem, Byting the Hand That Heeds Them, MAINE TIMES, May 12, 1995, at 16 (referencing
Time's decision to "digitally darken O.J. Simpson's complexion to make him look more
sinister").
32. See Marge Injasoulian & Gregory L. Leisse, Media Crises, 36 CATH. LAW. 97, 106-07
(1995) (noting that the hysteria surrounding the press's quest for sensationalism and, thus, in-
creased readership and viewership, often leads to "inaccurate reporting and incomplete source
verification"); see also Kevin A. Isern, When Is First Amendment Speech No Longer Protected by
the First Amendment: A Plaintiffs Perspective of Agricultural Disparagement, 10 DEPAUL Bus.
L.J. 233, 256 (1998) (noting the controversy surrounding Oprah Winfrey's dissemination of false
information regarding the safety of beef products in the United States, and her show's pur-
poseful editing and packaging of the false information, including the deletion of scientific rebut-
tal, in order to increase ratings).
33. See Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 GEO. L.J. 2267, 2269-70
(1998) (noting the economic pressure on media to lean towards sensationalism and, thus, dis-
serve democratic ideals).
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to the argument that the media inflames rather than informs, and in-
cites rather than educates. Indeed, when motivation devolves solely
to profit, media contravenes its ethical responsibility to inform fully
and honestly.34
Despite its negative byproducts, autonomous behavior in the form
of self-criticism can check the negativity from media frenzy. For ex-
ample, after Time published the sinister-looking photograph of O.J.
Simpson, other sources reported the outrage of those who thought the
magazine inappropriately inflamed racial attitudes. Time ultimately
acknowledged the error as an unintended consequence. 35 Another
example of a check on media's behavior was the reported outrage ex-
pressed over erroneous projections in the 2000 presidential election.
After resounding public criticism, many broadcast sources took un-
precedented steps to reform the procedures used to report election
returns. 36
34. See supra note 23 (listing various journalistic ethics codes). One negative by-product of
media's drive for ratings is erroneous projections in elections and the accompanying effect on
the electoral process. See Election 2000: The Role of the Courts, The Role of the Media, The
Roll of the Dice, Conference Report, Northwestern University, Jan. 2001, at 21 (commenting
that the networks' rush to declare a winner in the Bush-Gore contest, and resultant errors in
reporting, were due in large measure to the quest for high ratings).
35. See N.Y. Times News Service, Cover Wasn't Racist, Time Magazine Says, CHI. TRIB., June
25, 1994, §1, at 8 (noting Time's managing editor's posting, on an AOL message board, of a
statement discounting any implied racial bias in the altering of O.J. Simpson's photograph and
stating his regret at any resulting offense to the public). For other newspapers' printing of the
same story, see, Time Magazine 'Regrets' Portrait of O.J. Simpson, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, June
24, 1994, at E6, Time Explains Use of Altered Simpson Photo, S.F. CHRON., June 24, 1994, at
A13; and Deirdre Carmody, No Racial Bias Intended in Time Cover, Editor Says, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, June 24, 1994, at Cl.
36. See Editorial, Driving Voters Away, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2001, at A22 (editorial aside); Bill
Sammon, Networks' Early Call Kept Many from Polls: Florida Section Affected by TV, WASH.
TIMES, May 7, 2001, at Al; Letters to the Editor, BALT. SUN, Nov. 18, 2000, at A20 (opining that
the networks' erroneous call of the Florida winner massively affected turnout in the West, and
stymied Republican "get-out-the-vote" efforts in California); Daniel T. Zanoza, Editorial, Re-
membering Sweetness with Gift of Life, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Nov. 12, 2000 at 48 (arguing that the
major networks' early projections in Florida represented the height of irresponsibility and were
unfair to both Presidential candidates); see also David Foster, West Coast Voters Angry at Early
Call of Presidential Election, Assoc. PRESS ONLINE, Nov. 5, 1996, available at 1996 WL 4447931
(noting the concern by many groups that the networks' early projections of the presidential race
can dissuade potential voters, who have been told their candidate has already lost, from going to
vote at all); Terry Dickson, Let Pelote Prophesy Campaign, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Sept. 9, 2001, at
B1 (suggesting an election reform tactic that would forbid the reporting of the results from polls
in the East until those in the West close so as not to dissuade those in the western states from
voting); Ted Van Dyk, Editorial, Election Proposals Address Problems, SEATTLE POST-INTELLI-
GENCER, Aug. 9, 2001, at B4 (citing the bipartisan commission on election reform proposing that
"no national-election result in any state be projected until polls have closed in all [forty-eight]
contiguous states"); Yochi J. Dreazen, Networks' Coverage of Election Draws Study's Criticism,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2001, at B14 (citing a report written by a panel of three respected journalists
as criticizing the networks' reliance on faulty data and projections from the Voter News Service).
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Yet despite its more ancillary benefits, expressive autonomy's more
dominant manifestation remains the quest for profit. The commensu-
rate quest for audience often consumes decision making to the point
that other more noble motivations, such as multiplicity, become sec-
ondary. Conglomerate ownership and profit's pervasive influence on
media behavior compel examination of the industry's responsiveness
to society's diverse constituency.
B. Autonomy's Shortcomings and Alternative Theories
Autonomy-based notions of democracy tend to obscure a funda-
mental fact: Citizens exercise their rights within the collective unit of
a society.37 As a consequence, libertarian rights of individuals depend
upon the preservation of the collective interests of the society in which
they live. This reality compels a conceptualization of democracy that
extends beyond stark notions of autonomy. 38
Various theories espouse a broader view of democracy. 39 The
deemphasis of individual autonomy in order to maximize universal
participation by members of society constitutes a key concept of civic
republicanism.40 Civic republicans focus on the security of democratic
The report blamed the networks for "stag[ing] a collective drag race on the crowded highway of
democracy, recklessly endangering the electoral process, the political life of the country and
their own credibility .. " See generally Joan Konner et al., Television's Performance on Election
Night 2000: A Report for CNN (Jan. 29, 2001), at http://i.cnn.net/cnn/2001/ALLPOLITICS/sto-
ries/02/02/cnn.report/cnn.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
37. For more on "society," see infra notes 69 and 70 and accompanying text.
38. See Baker, supra note 8, at 318. Professor C. Edwin Baker, whose profound scholarship in
this area I accord full attribution, provides persuasive commentary regarding the need to define
"free press" in terms of the role or purpose of that freedom within a democratic society. Profes-
sor Baker begins this inquiry with a pivotal question that I paraphrased in the text of the Article:
If the Press Clause were designed to ensure democracy, then how should we interpret the
clause? Id. That inquiry, together with my subsequent description of the democracy's features,
provides the theoretical foundation for the discussion of media's appropriate role in society.
39. Professor Baker identifies four theories of democracy: elite (centralized theme of govern-
mental legitimacy); liberal pluralism (characterized by deference to individual equality and au-
tonomy); republican (focuses on the common good and citizens' concern for the welfare of
others); and complex democracy (borrows elements from both the liberal democratic and repub-
lican principles, thus noting individuals' searches for common ground and fostering of the com-
mon good, while also advancing their own individual or group interests). Id. at 319-39.
40. See Saul Cornell, Moving Beyond the Canon of Traditional Constitutional History: Anti-
Federalists, the Bill of Rights, and the Promise of Post-Modern Historiography, 12 LAW & HIST.
REV. 1, 7 (1994) (describing "civic republicanism" as a positive liberty that empowers a commu-
nity through the fostering of "public good"); see also MICHEAL A. GILLESPIE & MICHAEL
LIENESCH, RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION 85 (1989); David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in
Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 596-97 (2001) (espousing that civic republicanism
requires present desires to be fluid to accept the ideas from open debate, which should be inclu-
sive of alternate perspectives); W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession:
Social Norms in Professional Communities, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1955, 2001 (2000) (noting republi-
canism's feature of "interlocking relationships," and the State's neutrality in its conceptualiza-
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processes through a fostering of expressive rights of all members of
society. Thus, each citizen, regardless of socioeconomic status, should
experience meaningful participation in political processes of the body
politic.
To Professor Owen Fiss, the goal of any democracy should be the
preservation of self-governance for all members of society. Collective
self-determination, thus, becomes a central focus of ,democracy and
overshadows individual autonomy. 41 Fiss also posits that the free
market's tendency for unequal wealth distribution leads to a par-
ticipatory imbalance on matters of public interest. Those of greater
wealth dominate debate, and that domination contributes to a lack of
informed choices in political matters.42 Thus, autonomy preservation,
which is a staple of the free market, has value only to the extent that it
furthers collective self-governance for all members of society. 43 Fiss
embraces limited governmental regulation of democratic processes
(even when such regulation impacts speech) to promote egalitarian
public debate. 44
tion of the "common good"); William S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element
in Statutory Interpretation, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 629, 638-39 (2001) (noting republicanism's foster-
ing of forum deliberation); Hope M. Babcock, Democracy's Discontent in a Complex World:
Can Avalanches, Sandpiles, and Finches Optimize Michael Sandel's Civic Republican Commu-
nity?, 85 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2091 (1997) (critiquing Michael Sandel's civic republican model, which
envisions a community where citizens work toward common good in a seemingly contrary setting
in which the community exercises control over those citizens).
41. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1408-11, 1425
(1986) (noting the occasional need for speech restrictions in an effort to further public
discourse).
42. See Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 786 (1987) (arguing against an
overemphasis on autonomy, and noting that such an emphasis leads to the domination of debate
by those who control the economic and political "power structure" in society); see also Fiss,
supra note 41, at 1410.
43. See Fiss, supra note 41, at 1409-10.
44. Id. at 1412; see generally OWEN M. Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996) [hereinafter Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED] (espousing
the need to interpret the First Amendment to accommodate contemporary social change). Fiss
has maintained that media regulation may be necessary to preserve broadcast medium as a pub-
lic forum. See FIss, supra note 16, at 52-78; Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra, at 154-58. Fiss's
desire of a focal shift from autonomy to more balanced public discourse represents a public
debate approach to First Amendment jurisprudence. See Fiss, supra note 42, at 786 (espousing
that decisionmakers should judge action by the impact on the richness of public debate, rather
than interference with autonomy). Others scholars have more or less echoed this theme. See,
e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); C. Edwin
Baker, Giving the Audience What it Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 366-72 (1997); Stephen A.
Gardbaum, Broadcasting, Democracy, and the Market, 82 GEO. L.J. 373, 395 (1993); Thomas I.
Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REV. 795, 795-98 (1981).
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Professor Sunstein, like Fiss, embraces civic republicanism to the
extent that it fosters deliberative democracy.45 Sunstein posits that
democracy depends upon each member of society participating mean-
ingfully in public discourse. 46 Overemphasis of autonomy preserva-
tion skews public debate,47 fosters sensational journalism,48 and
contributes to media frenzy.49 Democracy requires that media maxi-
mize participation in public discourse on issues critical to the body
politic.50 The furtherance of universal participation requires some
measure of governmental regulation, the goal of which is the ultimate
diversification of public debate. 51
Summarily stated, Fiss and Sunstein argue for the deemphasis of
autonomy and a heightened awareness of balanced, meaningful politi-
cal discourse. 52 Such historic and landmark First Amendment cases as
45. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993) [hereinafter SUN-
STEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION] (advancing liberal republicanism or deliberative democracy
which requires legislatures to become more activist to protect individual rights); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Be-
yond the Republican Revival] (demonstrating a nexus between republicanism and deliberative
democracy); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29
(1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups] (advocating that the judiciary utilize republicanism
to evaluate political processes and outcomes).
46. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 45, at 1548-49, 1570 (describing polit-
ics as "deliberative," with an emphasis upon "collective debate").
47. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preference and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984)
(noting that deliberative democracy eschews resource distributions based solely on "raw political
power").
48. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71,
73 (2000) (stating that "many recent observers have embraced the traditional American aspira-
tion to 'deliberative democracy' an ideal that is designed to combine popular responsiveness
with a high degree of reflection and exchange among people with competing views"); see also
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASONS AND POLITICS (James Bohman & William
Rehg eds., 1997); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT
128-64 (1996), JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DIS-
COURSE OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 287-328 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996).
49. See Blake D. Morant, Electoral Integrity: Media, Democracy, and the Value of Self-Re-
straint, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2003) (describing media frenzy as the industry's proclivity for the
"schizophrenic-like" coverage of high profile events, and the resultant tendency to sensationalize
or distort news reports); LARRY SABATO, FEEDING FRENZY 6 (1991) (stating that "feeding
frenzy" relates to the press's obsession with more trivial aspects of a public interest matter,
leading the press to focus more on "gossip rather than governance" and "titillation rather than
scrutiny").
50. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 44, at xix, 93 (stating emphatically that "autonomy, guaranteed
as it is by law, may itself be an abridgement of the free speech right ... [m]y special concern is
that the First Amendment [can be interpreted in such a manner as] to undermine democracy").
51. See id. at 83; cf Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 44 (deemphasizing autonomy with
an eye toward enhancement of the "quality of public debate" and the "informational needs of
the public").
52. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text (noting Fiss and Sunstein's embrace of lim-
ited interventionism to further more balanced public discourse). For probative commentary re-
garding civic republicanism so embraced by Fiss and Sunstein, see generally Martin H. Redish &
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New York Times v. Sullivan53 and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC
reflect their civic republican philosophies. 54
Fiss and Sunstein's brand of civic republicanism has its critics.55 Al-
though I greatly appreciate the Fiss-Sunstein model, I advance a more
essentialist notion of democracy. 56 The theory I embrace comports
Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in Constitutional The-
ory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CAL. L. REV. 267 (1991); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Post
on Public Discourse Under the First Amendment, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1738, 1741 (1990); Robert
C. Post, The Perils of Conceptualism: A Response to Professor Fallon, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1744,
1746-47 (1990).
53. 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (stating that the First Amendment safeguard of freedom of ex-
pression on public questions "was fashioned to assure unfettered exchange of ideas for the bring-
ing about of political and social changes desired by the people") (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court held that Alabama law,
as applied by the lower court, did not sufficiently provide a safeguard against infringement of
freedom of speech and press in a libel action brought by a public official. Id. at 264. The Court
has followed the Sullivan holding in the following cases: Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S.
663, 668 (1991); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991); Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 7 (1990); Hart-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491
U.S. 657, 659 (1989); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1988); Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 244 (1986); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 487 (1984); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 156 (1979); Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 567 (1977); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976);
Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136 (1966); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local
114, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 (1964).
54. 395 U.S. 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail .... ). The Court ultimately upheld
the Fairness Doctrine, as promulgated by the FCC, as consistent with Congressional purpose and
the enhancement of First Amendment freedoms of speech and press. Id. at 391-92. The Court,
however, has limited this holding to the arena of broadcast television. See Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994).
55. See Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the
First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245 (2003); see also GEORGE A. KEYWORTH II ET AL., THE
TELECOM REVOLUTION: AN AMERICAN OPPORTUNITY 31-36, 52-68 (1995) (proposing abolition
of FCC); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable Wasteland: Why the Public Trustee Model of
Broadcast Television Regulation Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2101, 2102 (1997); Martin H. Red-
ish, The Adversary System, Democratic Theory, and the Constitutional Role of Self-Interest: The
Tobacco Wars, 1953-1971, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 367 (2001) (critiquing civic republicanism,
which espouses consensus and universalism, yet does not "do away with" or have adequate
mechanisms that address conflict).
56. Feminist theorists have historically defined essentialism as "a belief in true essence-that
which is most irreducible, unchanging, and therefore constitutive of a given person or thing."
See DIANA Fuss, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE & DIFFERENCE 2 (1989); Jane
Wong, The Anti-Essentialism v. Essentialism Debate, in Feminist Legal Theory: The Debate and
Beyond, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 274-75 (1999) (noting essentialism as characteris-
tics that are of the essence and, therefore, "unchangeable"); see also Camille A. Nelson,
(En)Raged or (En)Gaged: The Implications of Racial Context to the Canadian Provocation De-
fence, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1007, 1067 n.311 (2002); ELIZABETH GROSZ, SEXUAL DIFFERENCE
AND THE PROBLEM OF ESSENTIALISM IN THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE 84 (1994); Kimberle Cren-
shaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of
Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242-44 (1991); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Femi-
nist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH.
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with that of Professor C. Edwin Baker. Baker firmly believes that
each individual has the right to influence and engage others. 57 Em-
bedded in that right is the respect for the autonomous rights of others.
Consequently, autonomous rights of individuals, regardless of their
socioeconomic status, are equal and without priority. 58 Democracy,
therefore, is legitimate only to the extent that it furthers a reciprocal
respect for the expressive autonomy of others.59
In my view, democracy should not only secure individual liberties,
but also encourage respect for the autonomous rights of others. This
pluralist, respect-notion of democracy fosters fuller participatory de-
bate since the opinions and views of diverse constituencies are valued
and promoted equally.60 Encouragement of the respect for the auton-
omous rights of others in tandem with society's collective interest in
full and robust debate on important issues represents a pluralistic
form of democracy. 61
Of course, achievement of a balance between individual and collec-
tive interests becomes a formidable challenge given their inherent dif-
ferences. Expressive autonomy generally trumps collective interests
L. REV. 797 (1989). The term, however, has broader implications, particularly when one at-
tempts to isolate the essence of legal rules or theories. Essentialism in the non-feminist context
includes Ronald Dworkin's definition of characteristics of rights as abstracts defined in constitu-
tional interpretation that includes history, text, and philosophy. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights
Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 928-29 (1999).
57. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 59 [hereinafter
BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY] (1989) (stating that "respect for individual integrity and autonomy
requires the recognition that a person has the right to use speech to develop herself or to influ-
ence or interact with others in a manner that corresponds to her values"); BAKER, MEDIA, MAR-
KETS, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 9.
58. See BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 57, at 48-49; see also THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970).
59. Others appear to endorse Baker's dignitary view of autonomy. See DAVID A. J. RICH-
ARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 97-98, 165-78 (1986) (recognizing the "right to con-
science" as a foundational element of the First Amendment, and generally noting the need for
mutual respect for individual voices in a society); see also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM
xxiv-xxvii (1993); see generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE
(1980).
60. The theory of democracy I adopt in this Article borrows from Professor Baker's preferred
complex democracy. Individual autonomy and preservation of the common good are interde-
pendent concepts that must be simultaneously fostered in varying measure depending upon con-
text. For a more detailed explanation of complex democracy, see BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS,
AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 143-44. The author posits a more realistic theory of "com-
plex democracy" that draws on elements of both liberal pluralist and republican democracy.
"[Ilit assumes that a participatory democracy would and should encompass arenas where both
individuals and groups look for and create common ground, that is, common goods, but where
they also advance their own individual and group values and interests." Id. at 144.
61. See Baker, supra note 8, at 327-30 (stating that "liberal pluralism" recognizes "intractable
diversity" with conflicting values, ideas, and interests as normative).
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in societal processes such as elections 62 and governmental necessity.63
Perhaps the Constitution's express provision of individual rights signi-
fies a priority that contributes to this imbalance. 64
Expressive freedom broadly applies to both natural and corporate
persons. 65 This postulate empowers the media to exercise its expres-
sive rights,66 albeit with some limitation defined by context. 67
Personal liberties, particularly those related to expression, appear
to trump societal interests. 68 This result has guarded validity given
62. See Morant, supra note 49 (noting the prior restraint doctrine as the most significant ex-
ample of expressive autonomy's supremacy over electoral integrity concerns).
63. See Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a "Public Rights" First
Amendment, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1939, 1958-59 (2003) (offering a "private rights theory"
that balances the government's regulatory interest against a citizen's private expressive auton-
omy). The author cautions, however, that this theory "gives the Court substantial discretion to
cast expressive interests as trivial in the face of weighty, non-speech regulatory objectives." Id.
at 1958.
64. The Bill of Rights, which includes the First and Sixth Amendments, restricts governmental
action against individuals. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8 n.8
(3d ed. 2000); see also infra notes 65-74 and accompanying text (describing expressive liberties in
the United States as inelastic).
65. Media sources, as corporate entities, enjoy expressive freedoms guaranteed by the First
Amendment. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-60 (1990)
(finding that corporations, like persons, have the right to free expression under the Constitu-
tion); Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735, 739 (1995) (noting expres-
sive liberty as an originally conceived right of human kind, with institutional speech as an
abstraction from that of the individual); see generally Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and
Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 514 (2001).
66. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 444 (expressing that media of any form, i.e., information,
entertainment, or news, enjoys the right to expressive freedom, with the perennial question be-
ing whether rights of broadcast and other media forms are as extensive as those enjoyed by the
press or print media); see also PETE E. KANE, MURDER, COURTS, AND THE PRESS: ISSUES IN
FREE PRESS/FAIR TRIAL 68 (1986) (noting that a recent history of criminal trials has shown that
judges are more aware of express and implicit rights under the First and Sixth Amendments).
67. One context in which media's expressive rights may be tempered is that of a criminal trial.
Access rights in that milieu often depend upon the form of media seeking access, i.e., broadcast
versus print, and the impact on defendant's right to a fair trial. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,
539-40 (1965) (noting that different media forms required different scrutiny as decisionmakers
balance media access rights with a defendant's need for due process).
68. See Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 389 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding unconstitutional
a Washington state statute that restricted the media's ability to perform exit polls to a distance of
no less than 300 feet from a polling place); In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 811 (5th Cir.
1982) (holding that a local rule forbidding jurors to speak to the press after completion of service
except for good cause was unconstitutional as abridging the press's First Amendment right to
gather news); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 237-38 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding the media group
has standing to contest a participant-directed gag order because gag orders abridge the media's
First Amendment right of access to information); see also Morant, supra note 49, at 29 (noting
that the courts have dealt with the clash of expressive rights and electoral integrity by defaulting
to "the protection of individual autonomy, with more minor sanctioning of minimalist measures
that ensure fair elections"); Disa Sim, The Right to Solitude in the United States and Singapore:
A Call for a Fundamental Reordering, 22 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 443, 453 (2002) (arguing that a
"citizen's right to solitude must be balanced against the public's right to know and the media's
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that the Constitution expressly provides for civil liberties but only im-
pliedly recognizes collective societal interests. 69 Carte blanche accept-
ance of this priority remains, however, simplistically myopic in light of
the inherent interdependence of individual and collective interests.
"Society" represents a collective body of individuals who must coa-
lesce to some extent to further individual goals.70 Individual liberties
and sustenance of the body politic are symbiotic. Neither can flourish
without the other.7' Thus, a true democracy strives to achieve a rea-
sonable and admittedly difficult balance between these sometimes
competing interests. Overemphasis of individual interests can result
in group disparities that stymie participation in public debate by more
marginalized constituencies. 72 Conversely, an agenda focused solely
First Amendment right to gather news"); Marc 0. Litt, "Citizen-Soldiers" or Anonymous Justice:
Reconciling the Sixth Amendment Right of the Accused, The First Amendment Right of the Media
and the Privacy Right of Jurors, 25 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 371, 421 (1992) (arguing that "the
First Amendment rights to gather news and publish ought not to be disregarded without search-
ing inquiry and compelling justifications").
69. One of the most highly contested issues involving constitutional liberties is a woman's
right to abortion and the consequent societal interest in the health of both the fetus and the
mother. See generally Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Constitutionalizing Roe, Casey and Carhart: A
Legislative Due-Process Anti-Discrimination Principle That Gives Constitutional Content to the
"Undue Burden" Standard of Review Applied to Abortion Control Legislation, 10 S. CAL. REV.
L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 211, 233 (2001) (noting that while the Supreme Court has found a personal
liberty interest in a woman's constitutional right to an abortion, "[t]he federal and state govern-
ments exercise [their] implied power to protect life through legislative or administrative action,"
and thus protect the collective interest); see A. Michael Lee, State ex rel. Angela M.W. v.
Kruzicki: The Wisconsin Court of Appeals Introduces a Dangerous New Weapon in the Battle
Over "Fetal Rights", 30 GA. L. REV. 1183, 1210-11 (1996) (noting "a woman's express constitu-
tional right to physical liberty," as opposed to her "implied constitutional right to an abortion");
see also infra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing congressional recognition of the need
for deliberative democracy).
70. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Concep-
tions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 167 (1988) (noting a society as "a system
of power founded in entrenched divergencies of interest") (quoting ANTHONY GIDDENS, STUD-
IES IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 347, 348 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also supra note 37 and accompanying text (arguing that autonomous individuals exercise their
freedoms within the framework of a society).
71. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 35-46, 60-72, 85-86
(1982) (finding, generally, the codependency of individuality (autonomy) and democracy (the
latter pertaining to interests critical to preservation of the body politic)); THOMAS I. EMERSON,
TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4-7, 8-11, 14-15 (1966) (noting that
personal autonomy and meaningful participation in democratic processes are core speech val-
ues); see generally Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from
a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212 (1983) (advancing a more
pluralistic approach that recognizes both personal autonomy and preservation of democratic
processes as mutually essential components).
72. See Larry Catr Backer, The Extra-National State: American Confederate Federalism and
the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 173, 183 (2001) (recognizing that the somewhat natu-
ral tendency for personal advancement over other fellow societal members "leads to conflict,
anarchy, and ultimately reduces the possibilities for personal advancement"); LEONARD W.
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on collective societal interests may quash individual initiative.73 A
fully functional and pluralistic democracy continually strives to further
society's interest in robust debate, while simultaneously promoting re-
spect for the expressive rights of all members of that society. This
pluralistic concept is closely related to deliberative democracy, which
focuses on a fully participatory and public discussion of societal is-
sues.74 Within this theoretical framework, media optimizes its utility
and enhances public debate when the information it disseminates re-
flects a broad spectrum of viewpoints.
C. Multiplicity's Compatibility with a Respect-Model of Democracy
A theory of democracy in which autonomous individuals are en-
couraged to respect the expressive rights of others potentially maxi-
mizes participation in public discourse.75 This respect-model of
autonomy captures the very essence of multiplicity, and tacitly re-
LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 149 (1999) (stating the Supreme Court's position in
Dennis v. United States that individualized action in preparation for revolution can produce anar-
chy); CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 220 (1995) (opining that unabashed self-
regulation can lead to anarchy); but see James B. Staab, The Tenth Amendment and Justice
Scalia's "Split Personality", 16 J.L. & POL. 231, 265 (2000) (noting Hamilton's view that too little
power for government (and its leaders) is as troublesome as too much power, with the former
contributing to anarchy and possibly despotism).
73. See David Campbell, Breach and Penalty as Contractual Norm and Contractual Anomie,
2001 Wis. L. REV. 681, 691 (recognizing that communism's collapse during the modern post-war
era was attributable to its limitations as a "shortage economy" incapable of adapting to changing
circumstances); The Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor, The Life of the Law: Principles of Logic
and Experience from the United States: The Fairchild Lecture, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 1, 5 (finding
that communism's failure's was due, in part, to the public's view of alternatives through print and
broadcast media); Stephen J. Solarz, The Collapse of Communism and the Future of the Korean
Peninsula, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 25, 29 (1995) (noting the demands from members of the
public exposed to ideas communicated by external media sources as reasons for the collapse of
communism in East Germany and Poland); Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psycho-
logical Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1754 (1992) (attributing communism's failure to the
states control over production and distribution, and its inability (or unwillingness) to accommo-
date individual choice).
74. See Congressman Gerald B.H. Solomon & Donald R. Wolfensberger, The Decline of De-
liberative Democracy in the House and Proposals for Reform, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 321, 323-25
(1994). The authors describe a deliberative democracy as "an ideal representative" or republi-
can "form of government that allows the free airing of various opinions and perspectives on
governmental policy through the legislative process (i.e., hearings, debates, and amendments).
Id. at 323. The authors also characterize the elements of deliberation as information, arguments,
and persuasion. Id. at 325 (citing Joseph M. Bessette, Is Congress a Deliberative Body?, in THE
UNITED STATES CONGRESS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE THOMAS P. O'NEILL, JR., SymposiuM 3, 5
(Dennis Hale ed., 1982)). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the
Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 266 (1996) (noting that part of the "defining creed of a
deliberative democracy" is that governmental judgments should dictate regulatory policy only
when "undergirded by sound science").
75. See supra note 74 for sources that describe deliberative democracy.
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quires the media to recognize the perspectives of the increasingly di-
verse constituency it serves.76
Multiplicity consists of the dissemination of information that is re-
flective of the variant range of views and perspectives of a diverse
constituency. 77 The concept's expansive notion of participatory de-
bate relates naturally to deliberative democracy, which embodies dis-
cussion of important political issues by the broadest cross-section of
society.78 The relationship between deliberative democracy and mul-
tiplicity remains one of cause and effect. The furtherance of multiplic-
ity, which embraces ideas that appeal to a diverse audience, fosters
deliberative democracy's emphasis on full and robust public debate.
The two concepts are, thus, interrelated. 79
Voice is a holistic concept that constitutes a distinct perspective,
among many, on critical societal issues. Society's increasing diver-
sity8 ensures a variety of perspectives, a phenomenon that contrib-
utes to multiplicity of voice. Multiplicity compels a heightened
76. For more on the increasing diversity of the United States, see supra note 5.
77. See Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978) (noting that "it
is not too much to say that the 'nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure' to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples"); ALEX-
ANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 77
(1965) (arguing that the "citizens of the United States will be fit to govern themselves under
their own institutions only if they have faced squarely and fearlessly everything that can be said
in favor of those institutions, everything that can be said against them"); BUSINESS-HIGHER
EDUC. FORUM, INVESTING IN PEOPLE: DEVELOPING ALL OF AMERICA'S TALENT ON CAMPUS
AND IN THE WORKPLACE 29-30 (2002), available at http://www.acenet.edufbookstore/pdf/invest-
ingin-people.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2004) (arguing that students' exposure to diverse perspec-
tives in the college environment enhances their participation in democratic society, including
community involvement, volunteer efforts, politics, and activities that promote racial under-
standing); J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 379 (arguing that the long-term effects of the unequal distribu-
tion of power is an unequal exposure of ideas, leading to the stifling of new and more radical
ideas).
78. See supra note 74 for an explanation of deliberative democracy.
79. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed. 1982) (arguing that a rep-
resentative government ensures a more deliberative democracy); Carlos J. Cuevas, Bankruptcy
Code Section 105(a) Injunctions and State and Local Administrative and Civil Enforcement Pro-
ceedings, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 365, 424 (1996) (arguing that a proposed judicial standard
that limits the court's use of its equitable powers to enjoin state or local government proceedings
would ensure democratic deliberation by promoting civic republicanism, public values and the
common good); Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal
Regulatory Efforts To Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 763, 833 (argu-
ing that when agencies use adjudicatory proceedings to perform generic rulemaking functions,
the courts should apply a hard look doctrine to ensure that a participatory and deliberative
decision-making process has occurred); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 471 (1989) (opining that our constitutional structure "ensure[s] a
kind of deliberative democracy" by its hostility towards regulatory "measures that impose bur-
dens or grant benefits merely because of the political power of private groups").
80. See supra note 5 for documentation of increased diversity in the United States.
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sensitivity to the variety of viewpoints and perspectives of societal
members. Although multiplicity relates to content, it does not impli-
cate restrictive means to compel its implementation. The embrace of
multiplicity transforms media into a genuine catalyst for robust debate
on many issues, including those that implicate race, ethnicity, or gen-
der. Voice multiplicity encourages sensitivity to issues that are impor-
tant to traditionally marginalized groups and heightens awareness of
the effects of prejudice and stereotypes. 81
Multiplicity, however, has a broad connotation that extends beyond
race, ethnicity, and gender. While the concept ensures greater respon-
siveness to traditionally disadvantaged or marginalized groups, its fun-
damental objective remains the maximization of viewpoint diversity.
This broader conceptualization transforms multiplicity into a univer-
sally accepted norm. Consequently, governmental rules that en-
courage media's greater adoption of multiplicity8 2 should avoid the
strict scrutiny that the courts systematically apply to remedial pro-
grams predicated on race or ethnicity.83
Despite its obvious relevance to full and robust discourse, multiplic-
ity can become an ancillary factor in the decision to disseminate news
and information. In addition to media's motivation for profit,84 the
beliefs and attitudes of decisionmakers within a media source signifi-
cantly influence the information disseminated by that source. Media
sources often assume the ideological perspectives of either their deci-
sionmakers or corporate sponsors whose behavior is substantially im-
81. See Leonard M. Baynes, White Out: The Absence and Stereotyping of People of Color by
the Broadcast Networks in Prime Time Entertainment Programming, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 293, 304
(2003) (arguing that most negative stereotypes of people of color are learned through electronic
encounters, i.e., television); Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court
and the Conservative "Backlash", 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1529 (2003) (arguing that the media's
focus on only the most violent of crimes reinforces racial stereotypes); Ediberto RomAn, Who
Exactly Is Living La Vida Loca?: The Legal and Political Consequences of Latino-Latina Ethnic
and Racial Stereotypes in Film and Other Media, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JusT. 37, 40 (2000) (argu-
ing that the use of dominant stereotypes in the media reinforces "a biased and untrue perception
of reality").
82. Governmental rules that further multiplicity generally take the form of either contractual
set-asides for disadvantaged groups or ownership restrictions that prevent monopolization and
control of media sources. For a discussion of the contractual set-asides and the judiciary's in-
tense scrutiny thereof, see infra notes 107-122 and accompanying text. For a more detailed anal-
ysis of governmental restrictions on the ownership of certain media sources and the validity of
those restrictions, see infra notes 88-99, 141-163 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 119-122 and accompanying text (detailing the Court's Fourteenth Amend-
ment equal protection analysis applied to remedial programs that the government uses to rem-
edy discrimination based on race).
84. See supra notes 24-28 (discussing media's obsession with profit).
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pacted by their personal attitudes and beliefs. 85 In light of this strong
and virtually unavoidable consequence, media must conscientiously
and deliberately incorporate multiplicity in its decisions to report
information.
Of course, the technological explosion of informational sources 86
and casual observations of media's coverage of significant news events
may suggest a tacit embrace of multiplicity.87 Superficial or incidental
inclusion of minority or diverse views does not, however, truly mani-
fest multiplicity. Instead, decisionmakers within media sources must
consciously employ multiplicity as an integral consideration as they
choose news and information to report. In the absence of media's
voluntary incorporation of multiplicity, governmental decisionmakers
should provide market incentives that ensure media's responsiveness
to the informational needs of a diverse constituency.
III. INFLUENCES ON MEDIA'S Focus ON MULTIPLICITY OF VOICE
A. Governmental Advancement of Multiplicity-The Federal
Communication Commission's Initiatives
The twentieth century development of broadcast media (radio and
television) provided the means to disseminate information quickly
and broadly to a large audience-one that is usually greater than that
for print media. The advent of television and radio has led fewer
Americans to rely on print media for their daily news.88 Given its
85. See GERRY SPENCE, GIVE ME LIBERTY!: FREEING OURSELVES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 245-59 (1998) (defining the voice of the media as representing the owners' social and
political ideals); Ethan Klingsberg, Judicial Review of Access to the Media/New Trends in Access
to the Media-Beyond the Voice and Intended View Conception of Speech: Expanding the First
Amendment Goal of Rich Public Debate To Protect a Multiplicity of Discourses, in RIGHTS OF
ACCESS TO THE MEDIA 177 (Andris Saj6 ed., 1996) (noting the Court's perception of "voice" as
the "source" of a message); see also Lee C. Bollinger, Why There Should Be an Independent
Decennial Commission on the Press, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 22 (positing that the voice of a
nation's media is affected by its social and economic system).
86. See Wally Suphap, Getting It Right Versus Getting it Quick: The Quality-Timeliness Trade-
off in Corporate Disclosure, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 661, 664 (noting that "technological
advances on information flow" have led the SEC to require disclosure of financial information in
a quicker and more accurate fashion); Ted Schneyer, The Future Structure and Regulation of
Law Practice, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 521, 522 (2002) (noting that technological advances allow the
public to access a vast amount of legal information without the intervention of attorneys); Erik
S. Knutsen, Techno-Neutrality of Freedom of Expression in New Media Beyond the Internet: So-
lutions for the United States and Canada, 8 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 87, 111-12 (2001) (arguing that
technological advances in media types (e.g., Internet, cable) will soon render the historical prob-
lem of scarcity of broadcast frequencies nonexistent).
87. Indeed, during the presentation of this piece during the DePaul Law Review Symposium,
a participant opined that media's reporting of events are, at present, exceedingly diverse.
88. A recent study showed that 95% of Americans regularly rely on some form of broadcast
media for news on national and international events, while only 29% reported they rely on
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dominance in terms of audience, broadcast media has become a criti-
cal news source that overwhelmingly influences public debate. More-
over, the owners of media sources and their agents control this debate
through their discretionary choice of information that is disseminated.
Ownership of media sources, therefore, impacts the diversity of per-
spectives provided by those sources. The owners' discretion to report
information is a formidable right that remains broad and largely un-
fettered unless tempered by such public externalities as viewer prefer-
ence or governmental regulation.89
In recognition of media's influence on public debate, Congress has
historically enacted legislation that furthers deliberative democracy
and, commensurately, multiplicity. 90 By congressional authority, the
FCC has attempted to diversify public discourse through the enforce-
ment of certain broadcast rules.91 One such rule was the fairness doc-
trine, which required broadcasters to give sufficient coverage to
opposing views on public issues. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC,92 the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the doctrine, and decided that broadcasters acted as public trustees
national newspapers, such as the New York Times. Roper Ctr. at Univ. of Conn., America on the
Eve of War Survey (March 14, 2003), at http://web.lexis-nexis.comluniverse/formacademic/
s roper.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2003). See Krotoszynski & Blaiklock, supra note 20, at 870
(noting political candidates' use of television in conducting their campaigns, notably because
"television provides the most effective means of generating a mass audience").
89. Kathleen Q. Abernathy, The Role of the Federal Communications Commission on the Path
from the Vast Wasteland to the Fertile Plain, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 435, 437-38 (2003) (noting that
even though media owners control the content of their stations' programming, that control does
not go unchecked by the public's preferences); Carl Hilliard, Constitutional Conflict over Race
and Gender Preferences in Commercial Radio and Television Licensing, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 343,
347-48 (1990) (noting as the basis for the FCC's preference in limiting the number of licenses
one company can obtain, the assumption that a larger number of owners will lead to a larger
number of viewpoints, thus programming decisions reflecting a wider range of opinions); see
generally Matthew L. Spitzer, Justifying Minority Preferences in Broadcasting, 64 S. CAL. L. REV.
293 (1991) (acknowledging media owners' control over programming decisions, but analyzing
whether the decision-making process is, in fact, influenced by the sex and race of the owner).
90. See National Endowment for the Arts, 20 U.S.C. § 954 (2000) (founding the NEA for the
purpose of encouraging a diversity of ideas and views); Mark Seidenfeld, Hard Look Review in a
World of Techno-Bureaucratic Decisionmaking: A Reply to Professor McGarity, 75 TEX. L. REV.
559, 562 (1997) (noting agency structures that are designed by Congress to encourage regulations
that reflect a diversity of perspectives). See also Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)
(finding that the minority ownership preference policies adopted by the FCC were supported by
strong congressional backing and the important governmental objective of the broadcasting of
diverse views); but see Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavy-
weight, 69 TEX. L. REV. 125, 138 n.93 (arguing that "Congress's failure to codify the diversity
preference suggests" weaker support than viewed by the Court).
91. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (creating the Federal Communi-
cations Commission for the purpose of regulating broadcast communications).
92. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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based on the affording of an economic privilege in the form of a
license. 93
Notwithstanding its noble goal, the fairness doctrine ultimately fell
into judicial and administrative disrepute. Courts criticized its exces-
sive impingement on expressive rights and dubious effectiveness. 94
With the advent of new media forms and the questionable notion of
scarcity, the FCC ultimately revoked the fairness doctrine. 95
Instead of direct content regulation through such means as the fair-
ness doctrine, the FCC continued to influence broadcast behavior
through regulations that either established preferences for certain dis-
advantaged individuals seeking proprietary rights in media sources,96
or restricted the percentage of ownership of certain media forms. 97
Both of these regulatory mechanisms, despite their objectives to fur-
ther multiplicity, 98 have incurred considerable scrutiny in recent years.
As explained more cogently below, the agency's preference programs
93. Id. at 390.
94, See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (striking down the
FCC's fairness doctrine as contrary to "both the public's right to diverse sources of information
and the broadcaster's interest in free expression") (emphasis added).
95. In Syracuse Peace Council, the court held that the Commission's findings on the increased
diversity of outlets and programming in the then current market adequately supported its re-
fusal. Id. at 669.
96. The FCC's programs include lottery ((Communications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 309(1),
(i)(3)(C)(ii), (i)(3)(A) (1994)); comparative hearing preferences ((47 U.S.C. § 3090) (Supp. III
1997)); distress sales (Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 567-72, 579-89 (1990) (affirming
the FCC's policy race-based policy in distress sales), Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership
of Broad. Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979, 980-81 (1978) (arguing for support of distress sales which
were designed to increase minority ownership and, consequently, contribute to viewpoint diver-
sity); and tax certificates (26 U.S.C. § 1071 (1994), Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of
Broad. Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d at 983). The agency's lottery program was particularly designed to
give traditional minority groups a greater opportunity for source ownership. See 47 U.S.C.
§309(i) (1994). For a more detailed discussion of these programs and their implications, see
Krotoszynski & Blaiklock, supra note 20, at 825-28; see also Spitzer, supra note 89, at 297-302.
97. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (creating the Federal Communi-
cations Commission, for the purpose of regulating broadcast communications); Id. § 533(c) (au-
thorizing the FCC to "prescribe rules with respect to the ownership or control of cable systems
by persons who own or control other media of mass communications which serve the same com-
munity served by a cable system"). The FCC has recently proposed new regulations regarding
the limits on broadcast ownership. See Broadcast Ownership Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286, 46,355
(Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at C.F.R. pt. 47). Before this promulgation, the rules prohibited
any entity from controlling television stations which reach an excess of 35% of all television
households in the United States. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e) (2002). The proposed rule would
raise that limit to 45% and allow cross-ownership (of television, radio, and newspaper compa-
nies) in the same market. See generally Broadcast Ownership Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,355.
Michael Powell, Chairman of the FCC, has stated that the increase in the limit is justified by a
changed media marketplace, which supports an abundance of media sources, including cable and
satellite service providers. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 96-97.
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that implicate race or ethnicity have become suspectible to constitu-
tional attack.
B. The Precarious State of Programs That Promote Multiplicity
1. Guarded Judicial Tolerance of Governmental Programs That
Foster Multiplicity
Multiplicity's theoretical nexus with democracy justifies governmen-
tal efforts that encourage its embrace by the media. Multiplicity of
voice ensures fuller dissemination of information and resultantly en-
riches public discourse.99 Given this fundamental construct, one
might surmise that the judiciary would support governmental strate-
gies that encourage multiplicity, even if those strategies implicate race.
Early Supreme Court decisions tend to support this view.100 In fact,
these earlier decisions confirm the legitimacy of limited rules that en-
hance diversity and enrich public debate through prescriptions that
expand minority ownership. 101
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 10 2 the Supreme Court concluded that a
federal program requiring a ten percent award of federal public works
grants to minority contractors was permissible under equal protection
principles embodied in the Fifth Amendment. 0 3 Instead of strict
scrutiny or another standard of equal protection review, the Court jus-
tified its finding on the remedial power of Congress to correct past
discriminatory behavior and the systemic pattern of discrimination in
the award of federal construction grants.10 4 Six years later, the Su-
preme Court commenced greater scrutiny of race-based remedies. In
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,0 5 a plurality of the Court
struck down a collective bargaining agreement that allowed local
school authorities to limit the number of minority teachers eligible for
layoff. The Court indicated that the Equal Protection Clause of the
99. See supra notes 75-87 and accompanying text (noting multiplicity's furtherance of deliber-
ative democracy and its compatibility with a respect-model of autonomy).
100. See generally FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (finding the
diversification of mass communications through the regulation of broadcast ownership to be a
judicially sustainable tactic to promote a compelling public interest).
101. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (noting that the First Amend-
ment "rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from di-
verse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public"); see generally FCC v.
Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (holding that a policy promoting the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse sources is consistent with the First
Amendment).
102. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
103. Id. at 491-92.
104. Id. at 489.
105. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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Fourteenth Amendment required a demonstration of past discrimina-
tion by the government. 106
The judiciary's seeming hostility toward remedial programs predi-
cated on race became most evident in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co. 107 In Croson, a contractor challenged a directive that gen-
eral contractors who were awarded city construction contracts must
subcontract at least thirty percent of the total contract amount to one
or more minority business enterprises. The thirty percent set-aside,
however, did not apply to contracts awarded to minority-owned gen-
eral contractors. 108 In its holding, the Court distinguished Fullilove,
noting that the City of Richmond, unlike Congress, did not have the
remedial power granted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The city could implement remedial programs if it demonstrated
that it had participated in systematic racial discrimination in the local
construction industry. The city, however, did not substantiate the
prevalence of overt discrimination in the Richmond construction in-
dustry. The Court, accordingly, opined that the city lacked a compel-
ling interest that justified the apportionment of public contracts on the
basis of race. 10 9
One year after Croson, the Supreme Court seemingly mollified its
stance against programs that expand proprietary opportunities for mi-
norities in the broadcast industry. In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC,110 the Court reviewed a challenge to FCC regulations that pro-
vided a preference for those who either sought new licenses or at-
tempted to purchase existing stations. The resultant diversification of
ownership could ultimately foster multiplicity within the media indus-
try.' As the Court observed, the FCC's rules sought to expand the
control of mass media sources 1 2 and thereby secure more diversity in
the information disseminated by these broadcast outlets. 113 The regu-
106. Id. at 274.
107. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
108. Id. at 477-78.
109. Id. at 505.
110. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
111. See supra notes 75-87 and accompanying text (defining multiplicity in terms of viewpoint
diversity).
112. In re Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
Relative to Community Antenna Television Sys.; and Inquiry into the Dev. of Communications
Tech. and Servs. To Formulate Regulatory Policy and Rulemaking and/or Legislative Proposals,
39 F.C.C.2d 377, 391 (1973).
113. See FCC Abandons Proposal To Limit Multiple Ownership of Cable TV Systems, and
Initiates New Proposal To Permit Ownership of Cable Systems by Major TV Networks; Amend-
ment to the Commission's Rules Relative to Diversification of Control of Community Antenna
Television Systems, 4(10) EN'. L. REP. 2, 3 (1982). The author notes that "the FCC's 'cross-
ownership' rule was designed to foster diversification of control of the channels of mass commu-
20041
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lations manifested the FCC's recognition of the critical intersection
between viewpoint diversity and ownership of media sources. 114 Re-
sponding to the challenge that the FCC's regulations violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution,
the Court held that the agency's preference programs served the im-
portant governmental objective of promoting diversity within the
broadcast industry. Furthermore, the agency's regulations were sub-
stantially related to achieving that objective.' 15 The Court ultimately
concluded that "benign race-conscious measures mandated by Con-
gress for such an important purpose as diversity need satisfy interme-
diate, rather than the strict scrutiny applied to state and local
preference programs."'1 6
Decisions subsequent to Metro Broadcasting, Inc., however, sug-
gested a discernable shift in the Court's view of remedial programs
predicated on race. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,'1 7 the
Court retreated completely from its tolerance of race-based programs.
Writing for the majority, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor repudiated the
Metro Broadcasting decision as aberrational and inapposite to
Croson's requirement that governmental programs must survive strict
scrutiny. The Court, accordingly, overruled Metro Broadcasting, Inc.,
and found that the federal set-aside program that created racial pref-
nication" and addresses three concerns: the fear that the networks "would restrict the amount
and diversity of programming supplied to ... cable systems in order to minimize competition for
their network television programming"; the concern that "network-owned cable systems would
refuse to carry the programming of rival networks .. . thus hinder[ing] the development of new
cable networks altogether"; and the fear that "permitting [the networks] to own cable systems
would increase their already dominant position." See also Timothy G. Gauger, Comment, The
Constitutionality of the FCC's Use of Race and Sex in the Granting of Broadcast Licenses, 83 Nw.
U. L. REV. 665, 671-72 (1989) (citing a 1965 FCC Policy Statement as stating that the criteria it
would use in comparative hearings were whether the outcome resulted in the best practicable
service to the public and a maximum of diffusion of control of the media of mass communica-
tions, referred to as diversification); Alison Melnick, Comment, Access to Cable Television: A
Critique of the Affirmative Duty Theory of the First Amendment, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1409
(1982) (noting the Court's finding that the rationale for promoting diversity in broadcasting rests
upon the belief that the purpose of the first amendment is to "preserve an uninhibited market-
place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail") (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).
114. Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at 566.
115. Id. at 600.
116. See id. at 564-65 (holding that "benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress
... are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important governmental objec-
tives within the power of Congress and are substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives"). Metro Broadcasting was eventually overruled on different grounds by Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515
U.S. 200 (level of judicial analysis applied to the review of all racial classifications imposed by
federal, state, or local governments is strict scrutiny).
117. 515 U.S. 200.
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erences in highway construction contracting violated Fifth Amend-
ment due process norms."18
Adarand seemingly galvanized the Court's enmity toward race-con-
scious remedies for past discrimination. Any such program that uses
race as a foundational premise must survive strict scrutiny to ensure
that it furthers a compelling governmental interest.11 9
Imposition of a strict scrutiny standard appeared to have struck a
deathblow for race-based, remedial programs. Justice O'Connor,
however, rejected this "strict in theory, but fatal in fact" view.120 She
believed that preference programs could withstand scrutiny if the gov-
ernment narrowly tailored those programs to further a compelling in-
terest. Yet Justice O'Connor's attempt to debunk the fatalism of strict
scrutiny rang hollow in light of Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas's views on the matter. Justice Scalia's concurrence in
Adarand noted that the government could never have an interest com-
pelling enough to sanction discrimination based on race to atone for
past racial discrimination. 121 Justice Thomas added that programs
predicated on race "can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other
form of discrimination." 122 Judging only from his concurring vote,
Justice Anthony Kennedy likely supported, to some extent, this more
suspect view of remedial programs. Without a seismic shift in thinking
among the Justices, it seemed unlikely that any race-based program
would survive strict scrutiny.
Justice O'Connor's dicta regarding the possible viability of race-
based remedies, nonetheless, had a prophetic ring. The critical ques-
tion left unanswered in Adarand was whether the achievement of di-
versity in any context constitutes a compelling state interest. The
Court answered this question in the much anticipated case of Grutter
v. Bollinger.123
118. Id. at 227.
119. Id. at 235. The Court held that "[flederal racial classifications, like those of a State, must
serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that inter-
est." Id. (construing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 496 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)).
120. Id. at 202.
121. Id.
122. Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 241.
123. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003), reh'g denied 124 S. Ct. 35 (2003). See Leo-
nard M. Baynes, Paradoxes of Racial Stereotypes, Diversity and Past Discrimination in Establish-
ing Affirmative Action in FCC Broadcast Licensing, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 979, 981 (2000) (stating
that the Adarand decision was problematic in that "the court did not express an opinion on
whether diversity was still a compelling governmental interest .... [I]t calls into question the
legitimacy of all FCC affirmative action programs based on diversity, and it fails to take into
account that the FCC programs were premised on strong First Amendment considerations").
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2. The Subtle Implications of Grutter v. Bollinger on Race-Based
Programs that Further Multiplicity
Grutter focused on a program designed to enhance diversity within
higher education. The facts of the case included a white Michigan res-
ident who, with a 3.8 grade point average and 161 LSAT score, chal-
lenged her denial of admission to the University of Michigan Law
School. She alleged that the law school's use of race as a predominant
factor significantly enhanced the chances of admission of certain mi-
nority group members at the expense of applicants from disfavored
racial groups. 124 The University of Michigan argued that a diverse
student body constituted a compelling interest that justified the con-
sideration of race in admissions.125
The Court commenced with a predictive analysis of Grutter. Writ-
ing for the majority once again, Justice O'Connor first reiterated that
governmental actions based on race should be reviewed under strict
scrutiny to ensure that the government had not infringed an individu-
als's right to equal protection of the laws. 126 Similar to her finding in
Adarand, she discounted the view that strict scrutiny automatically
dooms a remedial program. She emphasized that race-based govern-
mental actions should be reviewed within the context in which they
are applied. To this end, the University of Michigan Law School ar-
gued that the state had a compelling interest to maintain a diverse
student body in higher education. 127
Under the first prong of strict scrutiny analysis, the Court endorsed
Justice Lewis Powell's view, which he expressed in Regents of the Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke,128 that a diverse student body consti-
tutes a compelling state interest that supports the consideration of
race in university admissions. 129 The Court rejected the notion that
only government programs that used race to remedy past discrimina-
tion could survive scrutiny. 130 Emphasizing the uniqueness of the ed-
ucational context, the Court observed: "Given the important purpose
of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought
associated with the university environment, universities occupy a spe-
cial niche in our constitutional tradition."'1 3'
124. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332-33.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2338 (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237).
127. Id.
128. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
129. Id. at 2337.
130. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
131. Id.
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The Court in Grutter then shifted its focus to strict scrutiny's second
prong, which requires governmental programs to be narrowly tailored.
The majority determined that a quota system that insulates each cate-
gory of applicants from competition with all other applicants would
not satisfy this requirement. 132 Race or ethnicity merely constituted
one positive factor in a candidate's overall application. 133
The Court ultimately found the University of Michigan Law
School's admissions program to have been "holistic" in its review of
applications, and functioned to discover how the applicant, regardless
of race, could contribute to the university's goal of diversity. 34 The
Law School's program was constitutional, and it adequately ensured
that all factors that impact diversity were meaningfully considered
alongside race.135
The implications of Grutter, particularly as it relates to race-based
programs that further multiplicity in the media industry, remain to be
seen. Similar to the University of Michigan's argument in Grutter, one
might posit that diversity constitutes a compelling governmental ob-
jective for the media industry. Programs that diversify the ownership
of media sources could broaden public discourse and, accordingly,
augment media's service to a democracy that thrives to ensure mutual
respect for the expressive rights of all citizens of society. 136 Govern-
mental programs that enhance opportunities for historically dis-
counted groups potentially foster multiplicity, which, in turn, fosters
reciprocal respect for the autonomous expressive rights of others. 137
Of course, one may argue that race-based set-asides potentially
prompt those who feel unfairly disadvantaged by these programs to
become hostile toward the rights of the historically disadvantaged.
Yet this potential attitudinal effect represents only one, perhaps short-
term, impact of set-asides. These programs serve as procedural con-
structs which, over time, diversify the power structures of media
132. Id. at 2342.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2343.
135. Id. at 2344.
136. See supra notes 75-87 and accompanying text (discussing multiplicity's compatibility with
a mutual respect theory of democracy).
137. Of course, one may argue that race-based set-aside and similar programs potentially
cause those who feel disadvantaged by these programs to become hostile or unsympathetic to
the autonomous rights of historically disadvantaged groups such as minorities and women. I
posit, however, that mutual respect of autonomous rights constitutes a procedural as well as
attitudinal construct. Viewed within the lens of procedural manifestations of respect, race-based
programs provide minorities and women greater access to public discourse through ownership of
sources. This enhanced participation theoretically compels consideration of the views of those
whose voices may have been minimized, muted, or ignored.
2004]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
sources. That diversification has the potential to ensure greater sensi-
tivity to the views of traditionally marginalized groups, maximize par-
ticipation by members of those groups in public discourse and,
therefore, enrich democratic processes. 138
Justice O'Connor has clearly warned, however, that the Court's
finding of racial diversity as a compelling interest was confined to the
educational context. 139 Grutter's limited applicability portends the
vulnerability of race-based programs designed to further multiplicity
within the media industry. Despite their utilitarian objectives, these
programs face the formidable challenge of strict scrutiny and proof of
a compelling governmental interest in diverse ownership of media
sources. The Court's requirement of a demonstrative nexus between
diverse ownership and viewpoint diversity looms as an impediment to
the constitutionality of these programs. This reality, together with the
difficulty of narrowly tailoring these programs, may suggest the need
to expand interventionist strategies beyond the spectrum of race.
Others, particularly Professor Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., have
echoed this sentiment and criticized the FCC's implementation of
preferences when the Commission has fundamentally failed to con-
nect minority ownership to viewpoint diversity. 140
Clearly, race-based programs designed to foster multiplicity face
formidable legal challenges. Race-consciousness aside, however, one
might assume that carefully crafted, race-neutral rules that minimize
the monopolization of media sources would constitute permissible and
governmentally preferable means to ensure viewpoint diversity. The
FCC, nonetheless, appears poised to relax its legally viable programs
that prevent media conglomeration and, commensurately, further
multiplicity.
138. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (explaining that a mutual-respect theory of
democracy enhances public debate); but see infra note 140 and accompanying text (offering co-
gent arguments that race-based set-asides in the media industry are basically ineffectual).
139. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347.
140. Professor Krotoszynski and A. Richard M. Blaiklock challenge the FCC's notion that its
regulations that increase minority ownership of, or decision-making authority in, media sources
furthers viewpoint diversity. Krotoszynski and Blaiklock observe that the lack of nexus between
a person's status as a minority and her viewpoints. Krotoszynski & Blaiklock, supra note 20, at
825. They, in fact, state that "it is insulting to assume that minority station owners would be
more likely to forego sound business decisions to pursue an ideological agenda." Id. at 852.
Thus, utilizing race or gender as a shorthand for the identification of group viewpoint is inher-
ently imprecise. Id. at 856.
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3. FCC's Modification of the Rules that Promote Multiplicity
The FCC has historically attempted to promote multiplicity with
race-neutral rules that controlled broadcast source ownership.' 4' The
original rules restricting ownership of certain media sources re-
sponded to concern over the scarcity of broadcast frequencies for
over-the-air broadcast mediums.142 Despite their longstanding utility
and legal viability, these rules have come under increased scrutiny by
the agency.
A policy rationale for the FCC's more intense review relates to the
rules' impact on economic efficiency. t 43 Rules that modify commer-
cial behavior often draw criticism due to their interference with the
natural forces of a competitive market.144
141. FCC National Television Multiple Ownership Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e)(1) (2002).
The Rule states:
[N]o license for a commercial TV broadcast station shall be granted, transferred or
assigned to any party.., if the grant, transfer or assignment of such license would result
in such party.., owning, operating or controlling, or having a cognizable interest in TV
stations which have an aggregate national audience reach exceeding 35 percent.
Id.
142. See Lili Levi, Reporting the Official Truth: The Revival of the FCC's News Distortion
Policy, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1005, 1106 (2000) (noting the traditional rationalization of regulating
the broadcast medium as based on the scarcity of broadcast frequencies).
143. For varying definitions of economic efficiency, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 11-15 (4th ed. 1992) (defining economic efficiency as a state in which goods
are allocated to those who will pay the highest price); Badwill, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1845, 1855
(2003) (noting that market economics defines economic efficiency as "meeting consumer prefer-
ences"); Elizabeth J. Goldstein, Asking the Impossible: The Negligence Liability of the Mentally
Ill, 12 J. CONTEMp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 67, 84 (1995) (noting that "[t]he positive economic
theory of tort law defines economic efficiency as wealth maximization"). Some commentators
believe that government regulation of the flow of commerce or bargaining behavior interferes
with the efficiency of the market. The securities market, in general, is suspect to allegations of
inefficiency due to regulation. See generally HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE
STOCK MARKET (1966) (arguing that the restrictive regulation of insider information decreases
the efficiency of the securities market); see Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Eco-
nomics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 61-62 (2003) (positing that regulations limiting the
information available to bargaining parties "for the benefit of the behaviorally challenged,"
could result in diminished efficiency in the securities market, thereby increasing the risk to inves-
tors, "raising the cost of capital and thereby constricting the range of available investment op-
portunities for investors"); cf. Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent:
Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1091 (2003) (arguing that Regula-
tion FD (Fair Disclosure), passed by the SEC to cut down on insider trading and even the infor-
mational playing field, reduces agency costs and improves market efficiency).
144. See Chris Baker, FCC Chief Sees Upsets for the Giants; 'High Tech' Means Swift Changes,
WASH. TIMES, Jul. 8, 2003, § 1, at 1 (noting Michael Powell's, Chairman of the FCC's, belief in
the power of free markets and push towards less regulation); Jim Kirk, FCC Eases Restrictions
for Media, CHI. TRIB., June 3, 2003, at Al (citing Chairman Powell as justifying the relaxing of
regulations on media ownership by the need for over-the-air broadcasters to grow, thus reducing
costs and helping improve profitability in the light of the advent of cable and satellite providers);
Dick Polman, New Rules May Alter U.S. Media Ownership, Likely Revisions Could Limit the
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Perhaps the most significant catalyst for the review of these rules,
however, is the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the Telecom Act).145
The Telecom Act seeks to "reduce regulation in order to secure lower
prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications
consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommuni-
cations technologies."' 146 To fulfill this goal, the Telecom Act elimi-
nates provisions limiting the number of AM or FM broadcast stations
that could be owned by one entity nationally, and it also raises the
limits on the number of AM and FM stations that one entity could
own in a single market. 147 The Telecom Act also softens limitations
on national television station ownership to thirty percent, and directs
the FCC to investigate the necessity of limits on television station
ownership within a given market.148
The dominant objective of the Telecom Act is deregulation of the
broadcast industry. 149 The FCC must accordingly engage in rulemak-
ing to reexamine the continued utility of ownership rules. Note the
Telecom Act's precise language on this point:
In every even-numbered year... the Commission-(1) shall review
all regulations issued under this Act... that apply to the operations
or activities of any provider of telecommunications service; and (2)
shall determine whether any such regulation is no longer necessary
in the public interest as the result of meaningful economic competi-
tion between providers of such service. 150
Pursuant to the Telecom Act's directive, the FCC conducted
rulemaking procedures to determine the continued efficacy of rules
that restrict ownership of media sources.151 Michael K. Powell, the
FCC's chair, summarized the Commission's charge and focus:
Over the past twenty months we have been working tirelessly to-
wards achieving three critically important goals: (1) Reinstating le-
Diversity of Voices, Views, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 1, 2003, at A1 (noting that the large conglom-
erate firms, such as Viacom and Disney, have lobbied the FCC, arguing that market forces,
rather than regulation of ownership, would ensure diversity, competition, and localism).
145. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, § 1, 110 Stat. 56.
146. Id.
147. Id. § 202.
148. Id.
149. Id. § 1; Pete Schulberg, Itsy-Bitsy Chip for TV; Big Leap for Parents, PORTLAND OREGO-
NIAN, Feb. 20, 1996, at D1 (noting the deregulation of the communications industry with the
passing of the Telecommunications Act of 1996).
150. Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 402 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 161(a) (2000)).
151. See Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Sets Limits on Media
Concentration (June 2, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/
DOC-235047Al.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (noting the recent comprehensive review of own-
ership regulation and the FCC's goal of encompassing in the final rules, the protection of "diver-
sity, localism and competition in the American media system"); Telecommunications Act of
1996, § 402, 110 Stat. at 129 (describing the purpose of biennial review of ownership regulations).
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gaily enforceable broadcast ownership limits that promote diversity,
localism and competition (replacing those that have been struck
down by the courts); (2) Building modern rules that take proper
account of the explosion of new media outlets for news, information
and entertainment, rather than perpetuate the graying rules of a by-
gone black and white era; and (3) Striking a careful balance that
does not unduly limit transactions that promote the public interest,
while ensuring that no company can monopolize the medium. 152
The FCC continued to emphasize the need for restricted ownership
in order to preserve competition and viewpoint diversity. 153 Yet, de-
spite this finding for continued restriction, the FCC voted to modify
present rules to increase the percentage of media sources that may be
controlled by a single owner. The majority of the commissioners ar-
gued that the merger of television stations would result in better news
programming. 154 They also believed that the new rules would protect
over-the-air broadcast networks from the economic squeeze associ-
ated with the advent of cable and satellite providers.1 55
The modified rules would continue to prohibit any mergers among
the top four networks (ABC, CBS, FOX, and NBC); however, they
would allow media companies to own a conglomeration of stations
that reach up to forty-five percent of U.S. television households. The
new rules would also remove the previous broadcast-newspaper and
radio-television cross-ownership restrictions. Such hybrid ownerships
could occur in markets with four or more television stations. The new
rules retain limits on local radio ownership. A single company may
own eight stations (five in each class of FM or AM) in markets of
forty-five or more stations; seven stations (four in each class) in mar-
kets of thirty to forty-four stations; six stations (four in each class) in
markets of fifteen to twenty-nine stations; and five stations (three in
each class) in markets of fourteen or fewer stations.1 56
The FCC's decision to amend the ownership rules was far from
unanimous. In fact, two of the commissioners wrote spirited dissents.
Commissioner Michael J. Copps objected to the majority's approval
of the rule modifications on both procedural and substantive grounds.
152. Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, Press Statement of Michael K.
Powell (June 2, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatchDoc-
2350473A.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
153. See id. (noting that the new rules still retained restrictions against networks merging and
tightened limits on radio ownership).
154. See Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, Separate Statement of Com-
missioner Kathleen Q. Abernathy (June 2, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-public/attachmatach/Doc-235047A4.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
155. Id.
156. For a copy of the recently-promulgated rules on media concentration, see Broadcast
Ownership Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
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His objections focused on the FCC's failure to complete sufficient
analysis to confirm the effect of the modified rule on consumers. He
attacked the rules on substantive grounds, arguing that the FCC arbi-
trarily raised the limits on media ownership without assessing fully the
effects of this change on local media voices. In sum, Copps believed
the FCC put the competitive interests of the major broadcast net-
works before those of the public who seek locally originated news pro-
gramming and diverse perspectives. Despite these factors, Copps
opined that the courts would not find the rules to be arbitrary. 157
Commissioner Jonathon S. Adelstein echoed Copps's arguments
and added that the majority lacked demonstrative evidence to justify
additional mergers of media sources. Adelstein stated that the studies
on which the majority relied had been attacked on many levels and
were generally criticized as unreliable. 158
Public reaction to the FCC's proposed changes has been predictably
swift and vociferous. 159 Some have applauded the FCC's rule change
as a stimulus for growth in the industry. 160 Reactions from members
of Congress, however, have been mixed. Leadership in the House ref-
uses to interfere with the FCC's proposed change.' 61 The Senate,
157. See generally Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, Statement of Com-
missioner Michael J. Copps Dissenting (June 2, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-235047A9.doc (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
158. Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, Statement of Commissioner
Jonathan S. Adelstein Dissenting (June 2, 2003) available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-public/attachmatch/Doc-235047A8.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
159. See David Ho, New Media Rules Put FCC Chief on the Spot; Michael Powell's Moves
That Eased Restrictions on Ownership Left Him at Odds with Members of Congress from Both
Parties, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 5, 2003, at El (noting the negative political pressure the Chair-
man has received from both Republicans and Democrats following the promulgation of the new
rules on media ownership); Janet Hook, GOP-Led Congress Increasingly Defies Bush, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2003, at Al (noting that a large majority of both conservatives and liberals in the
House came together to approve a bill blocking the FCC rules); see also John C. Roberts, Dis-
honest Communications Reform, CHI. TRIB., June 4, 2003, § 1 at 25. The author, Dean emeritus
and professor of law at DePaul University College of Law, criticizes the explanations Chairman
Powell has provided for the new rules, calling them "blatantly disingenuous, if not dishonest
.... .Id.
160. See Associated Press, Senators Say They Can Force Vote On FCC Rule, CHI. TRIB., July
30, 2003, § 3, at 4 (noting the Bush Administration's support of the rule changes and subsequent
threat to use a presidential veto to block any bill Congress may pass which rolls back the cap
limits). The author also notes that many media companies support the change as necessary to
promote growth and competition in a market saturated with cable and satellite television provid-
ers. Id. See also Richard Simon & Janet Hook, FCC Rule May Bring a Veto Standoff, L.A.
TIMES, July 25, 2003, at C1 (noting House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman W.J.
"Billy" Tauzin's (R-La.) firm support of the FCC decision).
161. See H.R. 2799, 108th Cong. (2003). Representative Maurice Hinchey (D-N.Y.) proposed
an amendment to the appropriations bill that would prohibit funds to be used by the FCC for the
implementation of the new rules. The amendment failed by a vote of 174-254. The appropria-
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however, has introduced an extraordinary bill that would modify, if
not veto, the FCC's new rule. Approved by the Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation on June 19, 2003, the Senate bill
would prevent excessive concentration of the nation's television
broadcast stations. 162 The bill, if ultimately endorsed by Congress,
would effectively block the FCC's new rules and reinstate previous
limitations on media ownership. 163 Congressional consensus to mod-
ify the FCC's proposed change will not end this controversy, however.
President George W. Bush promises to veto any legislation that alters
the FCC's new rule. 164
C. The Promotion of Multiplicity in Media Decision Making-
Governmental Incentives and Voluntary Adoption
1. Toward a Broader View of Scarcity
The FCC's justifications notwithstanding, 165 there remain significant
factors that bode against the relaxation of media source ownership
rules. Even FCC Chairman Powell, a staunch supporter of the relaxed
rules, acknowledges the need to guard against the monopolization of
tions bill as passed, however, did roll back the percentage of homes that stations owned by over-
the-air networks could reach from 45% back to the original 35%. Id.
162. See S. 1046, 108th Cong. (2003).
163. See also Senate To Vote On 'Congressional Veto' of FCC Media Ownership Rules, 23
COMM. DAILY 146 (2003) (noting that the bill, if approved, would codify the 35% broadcast
ownership cap and include a cross-ownership cap and radio divestiture). Of course, the veto of
agency decisions is articulated in congressional legislation. Title V, Chapter 8 of the U.S. Code
governs congressional review of agency rulemaking. 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2000). That chapter pro-
vides that before a rule can take effect, the promulgating agency must submit the rule, along with
supporting documentation to each house of Congress. Id. § 801(a)(1). The rule takes effect
upon submission to Congress, but Congress may then void the rule through a joint resolution of
disapproval, which may or may not be vetoed by the President. Id. §§ 801(a)(2)-802. In the
event of an un-vetoed joint resolution, the rule may not be reissued in a substantially similar
form. Id. § 801(b)(2). A "major rule," however, does not take immediate effect, but instead
must endure at least a sixty-day waiting period after submission to Congress or publication in the
Federal Register. Id. § 801(a)(3)(A). A major rule is defined as:
[A]ny rule that the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
of the Office of Management and Budget finds has resulted in or is likely to result in
(A) an annual effect on the economy of $100,000,000 or more; (B) a major increase in
costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal, State, or local government
agencies, or geographic regions; or (C) significant adverse effects on competition, em-
ployment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability of United States-based
enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domestic and export markets.
Id. § 804(2).
164. See Associated Press, supra note 160 (noting the Bush Administration's threat of using a
Presidential veto); see also David Lieberman, House Vote on Media Ownership Slams FCC, USA
TODAY, July 28, 2003, at B4 (noting that by attaching a challenge to the FCC's regulations to the
appropriations bill, the House signals that it is confident it will survive a presidential veto).
165. See supra notes 154-156 and accompanying text (discussing the FCC's proposed change
to rules limiting ownership of broadcast sources).
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media sources. He states this view irrespective of the proliferation of
media sources. 166
If we accept ownership regulation as a mechanism that furthers
multiplicity, then the discussion should shift to the extent of restricted
ownership. The extent of that restriction, however, defies calculation.
In fact, any rule, past or present, has not definitively linked the per-
centage of ownership to the increase or decrease in the diversity of
views disseminated by competing sources. This factor may have tac-
itly contributed to the drive to relax the FCC's rules. To modify these
longstanding rules on this basis, however, seems short-sighted at best.
The effect of conglomerate ownership would, at the very least, be in-
tuitive. Intuition notwithstanding, the lack of a precise calculus of
ownership influence on informational flow does not justify an arbi-
trary reduction of ownership restrictions.
Commissioner Copps's dissent points to the capricious manner in
which the FCC arrived at the raised ownership ceiling of broadcast
sources. According to Copps, other uncontested studies demon-
strated that a thirty-five percent limitation on ownership bolstered af-
filiates' power to preempt network programming to promote the goal
of localism. The commissioners who voted to modify the rules appar-
ently have ignored this fact. Instead, they find the increased ceiling of
forty-five percent necessary to preserve competition among over-the-
air networks. Copps, however, believes that the competition among
these sources and their commercial viability remain secure. He argues
that the majority fails to acknowledge that over-the-air networks are
guaranteed carriage to cable subscribers and maintain the greatest
reach of any medium of mass communications. Thus, competition, at
least among over-the-air and cable broadcasters, has been equalized
under present, more stringent ownership restrictions. Copps further
observed that the majority produces no evidence demonstrating that
raising ownership limits to forty-five percent would promote the pub-
lic interest goals of diversity, localism, and competition. 67
As the history of regulation confirms and Chairman Powell ob-
serves, the principal justification for restricted ownership remains the
scarcity of sources from which individuals receive news information.
Powell, in his July 2, 2003 statement accompanying the notice of pro-
posed rulemaking, referenced the diversity index that assigns assess-
ment weights to various media outlets. After reviewing the results of
a survey of 3,000 Americans, the assigned weight corresponds to the
166. See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text (noting the need for continued limita-
tions on media ownership).
167. See Press Release, Statement of Michael J. Copps, supra note 157, at 10-11.
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value consumers place on various sources within those outlets (radio,
newspapers, broadcast television, and the Internet) for news and in-
formation. Powell posits that the diversity index supports the rule
change because it does not distinguish the news content of sources
within those outlets.168 Copps, however, finds the reliability of the
diversity index suspect because it fails to distinguish between the
amount of local news provided by a local affiliate station, for example
NBC, and news provided by a cable source such as the Home Shop-
ping Network. 69
In my view, Copps's argument has considerable validity. He tacitly
argues for a broader view of "scarcity. '' 170 I heartily agree. An empir-
ical determination of scarcity must reflect the dominant sources from
which individuals receive news of social or political import. The
FCC's present conceptualization of scarcity relies solely upon the
sheer number of any media sources for news, regardless of the size of
the audience that those sources attract.171 This singular definition of
scarcity is both misleading and myopic.
An increase in the aggregate number of media sources does not sig-
nal an end to the scarcity of sources that are most consulted for news.
If broadcast outlets and newspapers continue to dominate the market
as sources for news and information, then monopolization of those
sources threatens dissemination of different viewpoints. An increase
in alternative and underused sources does not ensure that individuals
will be exposed to a variety of opinions. If the objective is to maxi-
mize the dissemination of complete information to the greatest num-
ber of constituents, then scarcity must be viewed in terms of the
number of sources from which individuals primarily obtain news and
information.
Several polls have documented the dominance of broadcast media
and newspaper as sources for news. In a January nationwide study
conducted by the University of Connecticut, pollsters were asked,
"Overall, where would you say you get most of your news from: tele-
168. See Press Release, Statement of Michael K. Powell, supra note 152.
169. See Press Release, Statement of Michael J. Copps, supra note 157.
170. Id.
171. See Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, Statement of Chairman
Michael K. Powell, at 8 (July 2, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/at-
tachmatch/FCC-03-127A3.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2004) (arguing that the previous ban on news-
paper-broadcast or radio-television ownership could not be "justified as necessary in the public
interest in light of the abundance of diverse sources available to citizens for their news consump-
tion," namely the proliferation of news sources via cable television and the internet). Id.
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vision, newspapers, radio, magazines, the Internet, or some other
source?" The responses to the survey question were as follows:
Television 65%
Newspapers 21%
Radio 9%
Internet 2%
Some other source 2%
Magazines 1%
Don't Know 1%172
During March 2003, the Roper Center at the University of Connect-
icut surveyed 1,005 registered likely voters nationwide. Ninety-five
percent of those polled responded that they regularly consult broad-
cast news on the major networks, a cable channel like CNN, or public
broadcast stations such as National Public Radio to receive news
about national and international events. In the same survey, thirty-six
percent responded that they regularly read a magazine such as Time,
Newsweek, U.S. News, or The Economist for national and interna-
tional information. Twenty-nine percent indicated that they regularly
read a national newspaper such as the Washington Post, the New York
Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Los Angeles Times, or the Financial
Times for news.173 In a similar poll of 3,002 Americans taken April 26
through May 12, 2002, seventy-eight percent stated that they watched
TV news programs regularly. Fifty-three percent of respondents
watched TV network evening news programs regularly. 174
In a December 2002 poll, the Gallup Company also sampled indi-
viduals regarding their source preferences for news. This poll
presented the following questions and resultant responses: "[P]lease
indicate how often you get your news from each of the following
sources-every day, several times a week, occasionally, or never.
172. The News Media/Communications, at http://www.pollingreport.com/media/htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 21, 2004) (citing a Meda Studies Center survey conducted by the University of Connect-
icut Jan. 11-18, 1999).
173. Roper Ctr. at Univ. of Conn., Public Opinion Online: Worldview 2003 America On the
Eve of War Survey: Press, Television (Mar. 3-8, 2003), at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/doc-
ument?_m=4d8a855b80d3891lf3510b27aaf64clf&_docnum=l&wchp=dGLbVzb-
zSkVA&_md5=a8d724f5146084a61ca6ad25d32936ce (last visited Jan. 21, 2004). See Catherine
E. Vance & Paige Barr, The Facts & Fiction of Bankruptcy Reform, 1 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J.
361, 364 n.12 (2003) (citing a survey by the Pew Center For Civic Journalism that found that 59%
of those asked responded that they watch local television news daily compared to 44% who
responded that they read a local daily newspaper).
174. Pew Research Ctr. for the People and the Press, Biennial Media Consumption Survey,
(Apr. 26-May 12, 2002), at http://people-press.org/reports/print.php3?PagelD=618 (last visited
Oct. 31, 2003).
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How about nightly network news programs on ABC, CBS or NBC?"
The responses were as follows:
Every day 43%
Several times a week 16%
Occasionally 25%
Never 15%
No opinion 1%
"Please indicate how often you get your news from each of the follow-
ing sources-every day, several times a week, occasionally, or never.
How about public television news?" The responses were as follows:
Every day 35%
Several times a week 12%
Occasionally 29%
Never 24%
"Please indicate how often you get your news from each of the follow-
ing sources-every day, several times a week, occasionally, or never.
How about local television news from TV stations in your area?" The
results of the poll were as follows:
Every day 57%
Several times a week 16%
Occasionally 18%
Never 9%175
These polls obviously lack the scientific precision of more formal-
ized, sociological studies. This deficiency might consequently limit
their credibility. They constitute, nonetheless, probative barometers
of the public's preference for certain media sources. Despite the
proliferation of alternative sources for news and information, 176
broadcast media-television, newspaper, and radio-remain the over-
whelmingly dominant sources for news and information.1 77 Most sig-
nificant in these surveys is the fact that broadcast media consistently
ranks as the primary source for most individuals. Notwithstanding
procedural and methodological criticisms of these surveys, they sub-
stantiate the premise that a distinct segment of the media industry-
television and newspaper-enjoys the largest audiences.
175. Gallup Poll: Media, Personal Priorities, Dec. 5-8, 2002, available at http://nation-
aljournal.com/members/polltrack/2003/todays/01/Ol06gallup.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
176. See Press Release, Statement of Michael K. Powell, supra note 171, at 4 (noting that
there are now three twenty-four-hour all-news networks, seven broadcast networks, and over
three hundred cable networks, and that 85% of television households are cable or satellite ser-
vice subscribers).
177. See supra notes 172-177 and accompanying text.
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The mere existence of alternative, yet seldom used sources hardly
guarantees that diverse viewpoints on matters of governmental impor-
tance will be freely disseminated and, perhaps most important, re-
ceived by a sizable audience. If one accepts the premise that
television and newspapers dominate the informational landscape, then
it stands to reason that monopolization of these dominant sources
looms as an impediment to multiplicity.178 The presence of indepen-
dent sources such as the Internet or private publications does not en-
sure the dissemination of a variety of viewpoints and perspectives.
Regulatory control of the ownership of dominant media sources,
therefore, constitutes the primary, if not solitary, tool required to
maximize viewpoint diversity.
2. The Ideal Solution-Natural Incentives for the Adoption of
Multiplicity
Consumer behavior and monopolistic tendencies support the need
for some degree of control over media ownership. Rules that govern
market behavior, however, will continually face criticism and scrutiny
due to their economic inefficiency and lack of precision.17 9 Media's
voluntary acceptance of multiplicity represents a more intellectually
and, perhaps, legally attractive alternative to regulatory control. The
question remains, however, whether volunteerism will truly work to
foster the widespread dissemination of diverse views and perspectives.
Many media sources expressly recognize their duty as the "Fourth
Estate ' 180 to disseminate divergent views on matters of governmental
importance.1 81 Perhaps this ethical obligation will prompt voluntary
178. See Steven Brill, Holding the Media Accountable in the Age of Osama, Kobe, and Ar-
nold, Address at the Washington and Lee University's Ethics in Journalism Lecture Series (Oct.
3, 2003). Steven Brill agreed that the monopolization of media constituted a significant and
realistic barrier to responsible and responsive journalism.
179. See sources cited supra note 143 and accompanying text.
180. See sources cited supra note 10 and accompanying text (describing media's function as
the "Fourth Estate").
181. See Todd F. Simon, Libel as Malpractice: News Media Ethics and the Standard of Care, 53
FORDHAM L. REV. 449, 472-74 (1984) (noting the two most influential groups to promulgate
journalism codes of ethics are the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) and the American
Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE)). The SPJ Code of Ethics demands reporters be "honest,
fair and courageous in gathering, reporting and interpreting information." SPJ CODE OF ETHICS
(1996), available at http://www.spj.org/ethics-code.asp (last visited Jan. 21, 2004). The Code also
requires journalists to "[r]ecognize a special obligation to ensure that the public's business is
conducted in the open and that government records are open to inspection." Id. The ASNE
Statement of Principles requires that journalists make efforts "to assure that the news content is
accurate, free from bias and in context, and that all sides are presented fairly." ASNE STATE-
MENT OF PRINCIPLES, art. IV (2002), available at http://www.asne.orglkiosk/archive/principl.htm
(last visited Jan. 21, 2004). The Statement also encourages journalists to ensure that "an inde-
pendent scrutiny [is brought] to bear on the forces of power in the society, including the conduct
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adoption of multiplicity. Despite their inherent limitations, ethical
codes, self-regulation, and public scrutiny can effectuate behavioral
changes that ensure the public's overall benefit.
One vivid example of voluntary behavior modification was media's
broadcasts of election returns subsequent to its embarrassing coverage
of the Florida polling results in the 2000 Bush-Gore presidential con-
test.182 Blatant errors in those projections and the ensuing public con-
sternation prompted many broadcast sources to change their
procedures for reporting the results in the 2002 midterm election con-
tests. 183 In fact, I had the opportunity to test the reality of this behav-
ioral change. As a specially invited guest of the Cable News Network
(CNN) on the night of the 2002 midterm election returns, I personally
witnessed CNN's (and, to a more limited extent, other networks') cau-
tious deliberations on when to call contests on the November 5, 2002
election night. That experience confirmed, at least in the context of
election reports, media's proclivity for self-imposed behavior
modification. 184
Moral codes and affirmations as self-policing mechanisms do not,
however, ensure media's full embrace of multiplicity. For these codes
of conduct to have genuine utility, media sources must focus more
broadly on the rather holistic benefits associated with the dissemina-
tion of diverse viewpoints. Multiplicity's tendency to enhance the size
of an audience might be the catalyst that encourages its embrace. Dis-
semination of various perspectives on matters of public importance
creates a natural curiosity that attracts an audience. Multiplicity,
therefore, optimizes media's achievement of a larger audience. Re-
ports that include more diverse views create a synergy of contrary ex-
pression that virtually guarantees a sizable audience. For example,
broadcast sources generally secure better ratings, and a commensu-
rately larger and more diverse audience, when their programming
of official power at all levels of government." Id. at art. I. See also Erwin Chemerinsky &
Laurie Levenson, The Ethics of Being a Commentator H, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 913, 915 n.8
(1997) (noting that the journalistic codes of ethics are voluntary).
182. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Morant, supra note 49 (describing me-
dia's erroneous projections of the 2000 election); Susan E. Seager & Laura R. Handman, Con-
gress, the Networks, and Exit Polls, 18 COMM. LAW. 1 (2001); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing
Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79
N.C. L. REv. 1345, 1360-61 (2001) (providing the narratives of two voters who, on their way to
the polls, decided not to vote because they had heard media reports that Gore carried Florida
and were "convinced that [their] vote[s] would be meaningless").
183. See generally Morant, supra note 49 (describing media's voluntary restraint in reporting
results in the 2002 midterm elections).
184. Id.
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presents various perspectives and opinions. 185 A discernable nexus
exists between debate, controversy, and audience interest. 186 Report-
ing a variety of views that appeal to a diverse populace, therefore,
heightens the probability of a sizable audience and contributes to
profit maximization.
Media's possible voluntary adoption of multiplicity does not elimi-
nate the need to regulate control of media ownership. The basis for
voluntary adoption of multiplicity remains largely theoretical. Moreo-
ver, it does not, alone, ensure that media sources will report divergent
viewpoints on all matters of societal interest. The marked uncertainty
of volunteerism underscores the need for continued content-neutral
regulations. A minimalist approach to regulatory control of owner-
ship would ensure viewpoint diversity and secure a pluralistic and de-
liberative form of democracy that values participatory discourse. 187
IV. CONCLUSION
Media operates uniquely within a contemporary, pluralistic democ-
racy. On one hand, it enjoys the autonomous right of choice and, as a
185. See Roland F.L. Hall, The Fairness Doctrine and the First Amendment: Phoenix Rising,
45 MERCER L. REV. 705, 766 (1994) (noting that stations can secure better ratings and appeal to
larger audiences by providing programming with diverse opinions, such as following a conserva-
tive talk show host's program with one featuring a liberal host).
186. Reality programming, which has had its share of controversy and criticism, has generally
garnered high ratings. See Kimberlianne Podlas, Please Adjust Your Signal: How Television's
Syndicated Courtrooms Bias Our Juror Citizenry, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 6-7 (2001) (discussing the
popularity of courtroom reality television show, such as Judge Judy, which topped the Nielson
ratings index for daytime television shows); Francesca Ortiz, Zoning the Voyeur Dorm: Regulat-
ing Home-Based Voyeur Web Sites Through Land Use Laws, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 929, 931
(2001) (noting the new wave of reality television shows, and the accompanying boost in ratings);
Michael M. Epstein, Judging Judy, Mablean and Mills: How Courtroom Programs Use Law to
Parade Private Lives to Mass Audiences, 8 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 129 (2001) (noting that the rating
success of shows reality television shows have changes the landscape of primetime program-
ming). Perhaps reality programming has become such a media staple because of its propensity
for high ratings, rather than its quality or informational utility. See Angelique M. Paul, Turning
the Camera on Court TV: Does Televising Trials Teach Us Anything About the Real Law?, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 655, 668-69 (1997) (opining that Court TV has a propensity for televising sensa-
tional trials which garner higher ratings); Lincoln Caplan, Sport TV, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 23,
1995, at 18, 20 (noting that CNN's rating increased quintupled when it televised the O.J. Simpson
proceedings); see also Philip Pettit, Is Criminal Justice Politically Feasible?, 5 BuFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 427, 433-34 (2002) (noting that increased readership of newspapers provides incentive for
the print media to "home in on" crimes of a shocking variety); Colleen T. Sealander, Standing
Behind Government-Subsidized Bipartisanship, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1580, 1624 n.392 (1992)
(noting that televised debates are a great opportunity for candidates to reach the voting public,
namely because they overcome viewers' partisan interest and result in "increased viewership
from members of opposition parties").
187. See supra note 59, 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing the intersection of viewpoint
diversity and pluralistic democracy).
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consequence, disseminates information with the goal of pecuniary
gain. This more self-serving objective constitutes only a minor facet of
media's function. The industry also has an equally compelling and es-
sential duty to foster the democracy that sustains its very existence.
To this end, media must continually strive to enrich public discourse
and cultivate what Steven Brill, former owner of Court TV, calls the
"marketplace of ideas."'188 Creation of this utopian dialogue requires
an increased appreciation of the various perspectives and views of an
increasingly diverse constituency. As a consequence, multiplicity of
voice must become a paramount consideration in the industry's deci-
sions to disseminate news and information.
Efforts to advance multiplicity must be holistic and multifaceted.
Programs designed to maximize the ownership of media sources by
those who will serve underrepresented groups constitutes one strat-
egy. Media acquisition, however, is expensive and increasingly more
elusive. 89 Systemic oversight of media source ownership must, there-
fore, be supplemented by societal catalysts that heighten the indus-
try's sensitivity to diverse viewpoints and perspectives. Accordingly,
scholars, consumers, and other critics of the industry must encourage,
if not demand, that media sources become more sensitive to diversity
and its relevance in public discourse.
Mr. Brill is quoted in Bernard Goldberg's best seller, Bias, as saying
that "when it comes to arrogance, power, and the lack of accountabil-
ity, journalists are probably the only people on the planet who make
lawyers look good."'190 While one might challenge Mr. Brill's general-
ization of journalists and lawyers, his tacit indictment of journalistic
decision making remains significantly probative. The public must dili-
gently scrutinize media's responsiveness to the totality of its constitu-
188. See supra note 178 (noting Steven Brill's speech at the Washington and Lee University's
Ethics in Journalism Lecture Series October 3, 2003). Of course, Mr. Brill is not the only com-
mentator to promote the "marketplace of ideas." Professor Krotoszynski and A. Richard M.
Blaiklock have thoroughly discussed the concept. See Krotoszynski & Blaiklock, supra note 20.
189. The recently promulgated change in the FCC rules governing media ownership signifies
the current, less-compelling approach to the promotion of governmental programs that foster
minority participation in broadcasting. In fact, recent history has shown a progressive termina-
tion of these programs. See Marcelino Ford-Livene, The Digital Dilemma: Ten Challenges Fac-
ing Minority-Owned New Media Ventures, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 577, 578 n.1 (1999) (noting that
the 1995 repealing of the FCC-backed Minority Tax Certificate Program and the deregulation of
media associated with the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 added to the growing
lack of diversity in media ownership). See also Allen S. Hammond IV, The Telecommunications
Act of 1996: Codifying the Digital Divide, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 179, 191 (1997) (opining that
Supreme Court decisions, such as Adarand, have undermined the FCC's efforts at correcting the
under-representation of minorities in media ownership).
190. BERNARD GOLDBERG, BIAS: A CBS INSIDER EXPOSES HOW THE MEDIA DISTORT THE
NEWS (2002).
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ency. Public vigilance, in tandem with prudent governmental
oversight, not only heightens media's sensitivity to diversity, but also
secures the industry's role as a guarantor of democracy.
